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This dissertation studies inter-firm network formation and performance 
implication. Different from current network formation literature that focuses on the 
actor or dyad level, this dissertation examines network formation and its performance 
implication at the group level. Specifically, I examine: 1) How do inter-firm groups 
with different levels of density form? 2) When is a firm more likely to participate in a 
group with mostly unfamiliar firms? and 3) How do group internal and external 
network structures influence task performances? Using Venture Capital (VC) 
investments as the research context, I develop novel empirical designs to 
quantitatively test my theory. In Essay I, to investigate how groups with different 
levels of density form, I emphasize the path-dependence effect of previous ties among 
  
all potential group members and simultaneously examine the formation of all ties in a 
group. I find that both anticipated environmental adaptation and anticipated internal 
cooperation are important considerations in a group formation. Taking a firm-focused 
group perspective, Essay II studies when a firm participates in a group with mostly 
unfamiliar firms. The empirical results show that the group participation of an 
unfamiliar firm depends not only on the uncertainty it brings in value creation but 
also on the uncertainty in value appropriation. Essay III examines the impact of 
syndicate density and structural holes and finds that both have impacts on the startup 
company performance. This dissertation enhances our understanding of network 
formation by bringing in a brand-new perspective, by uncovering group-level 
antecedents of network formation, by illustrating the impact of concerns in value 
appropriation, by exploring group dynamics, and by linking network formation 
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Firms often partner to manage environmental uncertainty and to obtain 
resources. They have used partnerships to share information, reduce risks, cut 
transaction cost, and foster innovation, etc. Research has shown that both firm 
attributes and environment influence firm tie formation rate and firms follow 
mechanisms, such as repeated ties, homophily, reciprocity, and transitivity, in 
forming dyadic partnerships. 
Notwithstanding the important contributions, the current network literature 
has some limitations. First, the dyad-level research on network formation assumes the 
independence of focal dyadic tie formation from other participants in a group. 
However, partnerships in a multi-firm group are a simultaneous commitment made by 
every firm involved. Firms’ decisions to join or not to join a group are based on the 
identity of all other group members. Sorenson and Stuart (2008) expressively stated 
that modeling “the choice of a given syndicate partner as being conditionally 
independent of the other partners that have already joined the syndicate” is a 
limitation and “In reality, however, the decision to join a syndicate may depend on 
the identities of other VC firms simultaneously joining in the same financing round or 
even on the (unobserved) firms who were invited to join the syndicate but declined 
the invitation”. 
Second, due to the focus on dyads, the existing literature leaves out an 
important gap of group dynamics. Nevertheless, one tie formation in a group is 




interplays with participation of other firms in the same group. Thus, it is important to 
understand how the formations of ties among potential group members influence each 
other in the process of group formation.   
Third, the focus on dyads also limits our understanding of the performance 
implication of network formation behaviors. Given that performance implication is at 
the group level, studying tie formation at the dyad level breaks the linkage between 
network formation behaviors and group performance. Also, to examine how firms’ 
network formation behaviors may influence their task performance, the performance 
implication of group network structure should be studied with the considerations of 
group formation mechanisms.   
To fill the gap in the current literature, my dissertation takes a group 
perspective and studies network formation within a group and its performance 
implication at the group level. Similar to the dyad-level research, this dissertation 
from a group perspective also focuses on partner selection. Different from the dyad 
literature, this dissertation considers the interplays of tie formations in a group.  
In Essay I, I investigate the formation of groups with various network density. 
Instead of assuming focal ties independent of other group members, as the dyad-l vel 
research did, Essay I highlights the path-dependence effect of previous ties among all 
potential group members and simultaneously examines the formation of all ties in a 
group. I argue that both anticipated environmental adaptation and expected internal
cooperation processes matter in a group formation. Due to the importance of 
cooperation, potential group members are concerned about the future coordination 




groups. Using Venture Capital (VC) investment data between 1985 and 2008, I 
develop a novel empirical study design to simultaneously model formation of all ties 
in a syndicate. I find that syndicates with higher density are more likely to form in 
more competitive environments, in larger groups, in groups with greater 
heterogeneity, and in groups with stronger ties. In contrast, syndicates with lo er 
density are more likely to form when environment is less competitive, when group 
size is smaller, when group member experiences are more homogeneous, and when 
ties in the group are weaker. 
Developed from the group perspective in Essay I, Essay II delves into group 
structure with a firm focus. It examines how a firm’s previous relationships w th all 
other potential group members may influence its participation in the group. 
Particularly, I study when a firm participates in a group with mostly unfamiliar firms. 
I argue that both value creation and value appropriation are important factors in 
network tie formation, and that firm experience has opposing effects in these two 
aspects. I further propose that prior relationships among potential group members 
may affect formation of potential coalitions, thus influencing the anticipaed power 
distribution in the group. The anticipated power distribution inside a group will 
exacerbate or alleviate the uncertainty brought by an unfamiliar firm, which in turn 
influences the likelihood of group formation involving the unfamiliar firm. The 
combination of a firm focus and a group perspective enables me to explore the 
dynamics between one firm and other group members. Using the U.S. VC investment 
data (1985-2008) and a unique matched-sample generation method, I find that a 




same group with other unfamiliar firms, regardless of the firm’s experience. 
Meanwhile, the likelihood of an experienced firm participating in a group with mostly 
unfamiliar partners is positively related to the tie strength among other group
members. 
 Essay III examines the performance implication of group network structures. I 
investigate the impact of VC syndicate network structures on the likelihood of a 
startup company going public or being acquired. I expect positive impacts of 
syndicate internal density and external structural holes on startup company 
performance. Analyses on U.S. VC first round syndicates between 1985 and 2008 
reveal significant impacts of both network structure attributes. I also find that the 
positive effect of syndicate internal density is greater for syndicates wih four or more 
VC firms. Those empirical results are not found to be subject to either endogeneity 
bias or sample selection bias.  
 Overall, the three essays in my dissertation study network formation and its 
performance implication in the context of VC investments. These studies make 
important contributions in the following aspects:  
 First, this dissertation contributes to network formation literature.  Shifting from 
the dyad level to the group level, this dissertation provides a new way to capture the 
simultaneous commitments made in alliance or syndicate formations. It helps to 
explain the manner in which tie formations in a group influence each other and reach 
equilibrium in a group formation process. In the group-level network formation, it 
shows the importance of environmental concerns and cooperative concerns. In the 




uncertainty in value appropriation. Built on the apprehension of group-level network 
formation behaviors, it further fills in the research gap between network formati n 
and task performance. Thus, this dissertation improves our understanding of network 
formation by bringing in a brand new perspective, by uncovering group-level 
antecedents of network formation, by illustrating the impact of value appropriati n 
concerns, by exploring group dynamics, and by linking network formation behaviors 
with task performance at the group level.  
 Second, this dissertation also casts light on entrepreneurship literature. It not 
only illustrates the antecedents of the VC syndicate formation and VC firm 
participation, but also demonstrates how VC syndicate network structures may 
influence startup company performance. By studying both the internal and external 
network structures of a VC syndicate and their interaction effects with other 
syndicates attributes, this dissertation offers a comprehensive view of syndicate 
density’s performance implications.  
 Last, but not least, the network formation studies in this dissertation bridge the 
literature on network formation and the research on coalition. By articulating the 
importance of prior relationships in the coalition formation, this dissertation offers 
another explanation for forming coalitions. In turn, it accounts for future tie formation 






Essay I: A Group Perspective in Network Formation: How 
Venture Capital Syndicates Form 
Introduction 
Firms form many kinds of partnerships to obtain resources and manage 
uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). For example, semiconductor firms may form 
alliances for R&D purposes (e.g., Stuart, 1998), investment banks may form 
syndicates for underwriting purposes (e.g., Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, & You-Ta, 
2005), and Venture Capital (VC) firms may form syndicates to fund start-up 
companies (e.g.,  Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). Due to the prevalence and importance of 
partnerships, large amounts of research have been devoted to study network 
formation. Researchers have studied network formation at both the actor and dyad 
levels. Early research focused on the actor level, and found that the firm tie formation 
rate is influenced by firm size (Burgers, Hill, & Kim, 1993), firm performance 
(Burgers et al., 1993), firm internal resources and capabilities (Ahuja, 2000b; Gulati,
1999; Park, Chen, & Gallagher, 2002), firm network positions (Gulati, 1999; Powell, 
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996; Stuart, 1998), and environmental uncertainties 
(Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004; Koka, Madhavan, & Prescott, 2006).  
Subsequent research made important progress by moving from the actor level 
to the dyad level and by focusing on partner attributes and partner selection. It was 
found that firms are more likely to form ties with partners with whom they have
greater interdependence (complementarity), with whom they have worked before




they are more similar (homophily), and who have sent them tie invitations before 
(reciprocity) (e.g., Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Podolny, 1994; Powell, 
White, Koput, & Owen-Smith, 2005).  
However, despite the progress of network formation literature, how groups, 
such as alliance, syndicates, etc., form is underexplored.1 As indicated by Sorenson 
and Stuart (2008), applying the dyad approach to the tie formation in groups 
involving multiple firms has significant limitations. The dyad approach assumes the 
independence of focal dyadic tie formation from other participants in a group. 
However, many groups in the business world involve more than two firms. In the case 
of venture capital (VC) syndicates, about 45% of the first-round syndicates involve 
more than two VC firms, not counting the additional firms joining in later rounds. 
When forming a group, firms make participation decisions based on the identities of 
all other group members. Tie formation between two firms may be caused by group-
level reasons related to other participants. Therefore, studying group formati n using 
the dyad approach, which assumes tie independence, may result in incomplete 
understanding.  
Some examples may illustrate the limitation of using the dyad approach in 
studying tie formation in a group. For instance, the dyad research found that disan
ties were more likely to form in larger groups (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). The 
argument behind this finding is that the uncertainty brought by the specific distant tie 
will be less in a group involving more participants. This may be true if the other ties 
                                                
1
 Although Mitsushi and Greve (2009) considered the focal firm tie formation in a group regarding all 
other group members, theirs is not a group perspective in the sense that they still focused on “one firm 
versus others” observations. They did not simultaneously examine ties formed among other group 




in the group are mostly between past partners. However, if the two firms that form a 
distant tie also face other distant ties in the group, then these distant ties will be less 
likely to form in a larger group. The difference is exemplified by the two extreme 
scenarios in Figure 1.1, with two potential groups of different group sizes graphed in 
each scenario. As shown in Scenario A in Figure 1.1, where Firm A and Firm B are 
the only partners new to each other in both groups, Group (a) (a group of four) is 
more likely to form than Group (b) (a group of three) due to greater familiarity and 
less uncertainty, assuming every other thing being equal. Although group formation 
in Scenario A is consistent with the argument that partner-specific uncertai ty c n be 
reduced in larger groups, Scenario B, where every firm in a group is new to each 
other, shows the different side of the story that cannot be explained by the argument 
in the dyad approach. Every other thing being equal, Group (b′) (a group of three) is 
more likely to form when compared to Group (a′) (  group of four), as the 
coordination difficulties will be greater when the group size gets larger in a group 
involving more new partners. These two extreme scenarios show that tie formations 
in a group are correlated and all tie formations in a group should be considered 
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                           Group (a′)                                                          Group (b′) 
 
A solid line indicates that there is a preexisting tie between two partners.  
A dashed line indicates that no prior ties exist between two partners.  
The importance of tie correlation and the limitation of the dyad approach can 
also be shown in another example in which the moderating effect of environment on 
group formation is considered. Prior literature suggested that new ties between new 
partners are less likely to form in a more competitive environment. However, when 
taking tie correlation into consideration, not every new tie formation in a group will 
be negatively affected by environmental competition. The impact of environmental 
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competition on formation of new ties depends on group context. A group involving 
some new ties with mostly old ties will not be similarly affected as a group involving 
only new ties. As shown in the example in Figure 1.2, both Group (c) and Group (d) 
involve Firm A and Firm B, who are new to each other. But, different from Group (c) 
in which all four firms are new to each other, Group (d) involves two other firms that 
had worked with every group member in the group. Although the new tie between 
Firm A and Firm B is involved in both groups, the new tie in Group (d) may not be 
negatively affected by environmental competition. This is because the embedded 
relationships involved in Group (d) may help the group adapt to greater competitive 
uncertainty, engage in fast decision making, and comply to the legitimacy expectation 
in a more competitive environment. All of these facilitate the formation of Grup (d) 
in a more competitive environment and discourage the formation of Group (c).  













                             Group (c)                                                          Group (d) 
 
A solid line indicates that there is a preexisting tie between two partners. 
A dashed line indicates that no prior ties exist between two partners.  
As illustrated in the above examples, tie formations in a group are correlated 









but also on whether other firms exist in the group and whether other group members 
are previously connected. To take tie correlation into consideration, I adopt a group 
perspective to study group formation. This group perspective is different from he 
dyad approach in two ways. First, rather than focusing on one dyadic tie at a time,
this group-level study simultaneously examines the formation of all ties involved in a 
group, since the formation of one tie may influence the formation of another tie 
within the same group. Second, from the group perspective, the path-dependence 
logic in network formation is demonstrated by an in-group network constructed by 
preexisting ties among all potential group participants. Distinct from the dyad
approach, which only considers the effect of past ties related to the focal firm nd/or 
the focal partner, the group perspective integrates the influence of previous ties 
among all potential group participants on group formation through in-group network 
structure. This group perspective takes into account that tie formation between two 
firms may be influenced by preexisting relationships among other firms.  
Research has suggested that past interaction intensity among individuals is 
positively related to group solidarity (Hechter, 1978; Homans, 1950). Similarly, 
density among group members indicates cohesion (Provan & Milward, 1995). Due to 
the importance of group density, which is based on past interactions among group 
members, I study when do groups with various density form. Group density is defined 
as the proportion of preexisting ties in an in-group network among potential group 
members relative to their total possible ties. Group density is used to capture firms’ 
preference for past partners due to efficiency in search and effectiveness in 




construct the boundary of group. Based on such group boundary, I examine the effect 
of group density on formation of groups together with other internal group attributes 
and external environmental characteristics.  
I expect that both adaptation to the environment and expected internal 
cooperation processes matter in a group formation. Future groups will be formed in a 
way to better adapt to the competitive environment. The more competitive the 
environment, the more likely it is that firms will form denser groups to accommodate 
higher competitive uncertainty, facilitate fast decision making, and comply to the 
legitimacy expectation. Meanwhile, future groups will also be formed based on 
anticipated internal cooperation among potential group participants. On the o e hand, 
the concerns of potential group participants regarding future group coordination vary 
with the group density of the in-group network. Greater coordination concerns due to 
lower density need to be mitigated by smaller group size and greater homogeneity. 
But, higher group density will allow group members to benefit from larger group size 
and heterogeneity. On the other hand, group structure with lower density may cause 
concerns about coalition/power imbalance in a future group when it is coexisting with 
some stronger ties. So, a group based on denser previous ties is expected to form to 
offset the possible power imbalance due to greater tie strength between some 
potential participants, while a group with lower density is more likely to form when 
existing ties are weaker. These group formation arguments were tested in this essay 
with VC investment data between 1985 and 2008.  
Overall, this essay makes several important contributions. First, by focusing 




group and provide a brand new perspective on network formation. This is especially 
meaningful since the group perspective is more consistent with the real world whee 
firms make tie formation decisions based on the identities of all group members. 
Second, by taking a group perspective, I am able to consider the influences of all 
related preexisting ties among all potential participants and offer a more complete 
view about both path dependence and path breaking in network formation. Unlike the 
dyad literature that links formation of a focal tie only with the tie histories of the focal 
firm and/or the focal partner, this essay shows that tie formation between two firms 
may be related to how other firms in a group have been previously connected. Third, 
the group perspective enables me to uncover group-level mechanisms, such as 
environmental adaptation management and internal cooperation management, which 
have been neglected in the dyad-level studies. Group-level logics may invite 
reconsideration of the findings in dyad-level research, which assumes tie 
independence. Fourth, this essay illuminates group formation dynamics by 
introducing a political-process view in tie formation. It not only links coalition 
arguments with social network theory, but also highlights “power imbalance” as an
important contribution of resource dependence theory to the network formation 
literature. Fifth, I contribute a novel empirical design for quantitatively testing tie 
formation at a group level. By taking a group perspective, this essay contributes to the 
current literature both theoretically and methodologically.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
In this section, I discuss how group density based on previous ties among 




group density with environmental adaptation and emphasize that groups form in a 
way to best adapt to the external environment. Then, I link group density with the 
internal cooperation process and introduce the important impact of anticipated 
internal cooperation processes on group formation. Two main concerns regarding 
internal cooperation process, coordination and coalition, are discussed in this section.  
Group Formation and Environmental Adaptation 
Competition occurs when more firms enter into the market and compete for 
the limited common resources. It is a market property that is out of the control of 
individual firms. According to the adaptive view (e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969; 
Thomson, 1967), interfirm groups need to adapt to external forces to maintain 
viability. When competition is more intense, groups with higher density are more 
likely to form as they are considered as more adaptive to the competitive environment 
for the following reasons.  
First, competitive uncertainty is one important dimension of uncertainty 
(Burgers et al., 1993) and more competition is often accompanied with greater 
environmental uncertainty. Research has found that firms tend to tie with past 
partners under high uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004; Podolny, 1994). Firms faced 
with higher environmental uncertainty try to use “satisficing” search behaviors 
(March, 1988) and select partners from those firms they know best. Since firms lean 
more about other firms through their past relationships, firms will have preferences 
for the past partners especially in an uncertain environment. Research has found that 
repeated ties help develop trust (Gulati, 1995b) and trust matters more to alliance 




Noorderhaven, 2006). Thus, dense groups are more likely to form as a way to respond 
to higher competitive uncertainty.   
Second, Firms adapt to environments through strategic decision making 
(Swamidass and Newell 1987). In a more competitive environment, more firms 
compete for the limited resources. Therefore, fast decision making regarding group 
formation and group function becomes more important when competition is more 
intense. Higher trust (Coleman, 1988, 1990) and shared behavioral norm (Rowley, 
1997) developed in dense networks may promote economies of time (Uzzi, 1996, 
1997). The speeded decision making is demonstrated in both group formation and 
group function processes. That is, a dense in-group network based on preexisting ties 
not only facilitates the group to form in a faster way, but also helps the formed group 
adapt to the more competitive environment with a faster and trust-based group 
decision-making process. The quicker group formation and faster group decision 
making may enable firms in the group to obtain first-mover advantage in a more 
competitive environment where more firms compete for limited resources. For 
example, in the VC context, a syndicate with higher density may form faster to gt 
the deal quicker than a sparse group would. Thus, dense groups are preferred in a 
more competitive environment due to the fast decision making in both group 
formation and group function.  
Third, groups form in a way to adapt to the environmental expectation. 
Researchers suggested that firms are “farsighted” and act according to the anticipated 
reactions of others (e.g., Scherer, 1980). Thus, a group will be less likely to form 




anticipated. One important type of external reaction is related to evaluation of 
legitimacy and consequential responses (e.g., acceptance or sanctions) regarding the 
evaluation. Legitimacy, which indicates consonance with social norms or order, has 
been found to be important to network success (Human & Arizona, 2000). Concerns 
about other partners’ legitimacy influence firms’ tie formation behaviors such that 
firms are less likely to form ties that are hard to justify internally and externally 
(Hallen, 2008; Marquis, 2003; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). The legitimacy-related 
external reaction may depend on group density when the environmental competition 
is higher. Research suggested that legitimacy could be a desirable model of action 
(Johnson, Dowd, & Ridgeway, 2006; Walker, 2004). When the environment is more 
competitive, groups based on a dense in-group network may be perceived as the more 
desirable model because dense networks are able to reduce competitive entries to the 
focal market (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 2010) and the need to use a dense group 
network as a barrier to future entry is greater when the competitive pressure i  
greater. Thus, formation of lower-density groups involving more new ties may not be 
perceived as desirable and legitimate in a highly competitive environment. Groups 
with higher density are more acceptable in such an environment.  
Collectively, through competitive uncertainty, pressure on decision making 
and legitimacy expectation, environmental competition will moderate the relationship 
between group density and group formation Thus,  
Hypothesis 1: The more competitive the environment, the more likely it is that 




Group Density and Anticipated Internal Cooperation 
Group density may also influence group formation by affecting potential 
group participants’ anticipation about internal cooperative processes. Firm may not 
cooperate all the time. When their own interests conflict with the common interests of 
group members (Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998), some group members may form a 
coalition to promote their own interests, sacrificing the interests of other group 
members. Even when firms want to cooperate with each other, they may not be able 
to coordinate effectively and efficiently. Since firms are often farsighted (e.g., 
Scherer, 1980), I expect them to take these cooperation issues into consideration 
during group formation. There are two main categories of concerns regarding inter al 
cooperation: coordination and coalition. 
Coordination concerns. Previous literature has suggested that to ensure group 
function properly and perform well, there is always a need for coordination and 
cooperation in groups (Doz, 1996; Kanter, 1994a). However, coordination difficulties 
are a major challenge in interfirm relationships (Litwak & Hylton, 1962). The very 
interdependence among organizations that makes coordination necessary (Pfeffer & 
Nowak, 1976) often incurs coordination difficulties due to the different goals and 
commitments of the organizations involved. Therefore, coordination cost and 
difficulties have been noticed and discussed in various network literature (e.g., Gulati 
& Singh, 1998; Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997). For example, in a paper on 
governance structure of alliance, Gulati and Singh (1998) found that concerns 




and firms are more likely to choose a more hierarchical governance when 
coordination concerns are greater. 
However, concerns regarding coordination may affect not only the governance 
structure of cooperative groups, but also the formation of such groups. A group will 
be less likely to form when its anticipated coordination difficulties are higher. The 
coordination difficulties of groups vary with group density. Since greater group 
density facilitates trust and exchange (Coleman, 1988) and aids in mutual 
coordination (Mccubbins, Paturi, & Weller, 2003; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001), 
fewer coordination difficulties would be expected in a higher density group. 
However, when group density is lower, coordination concerns among group members 
will increase due to greater unfamiliarity. A group will only form when other group 
attributes minimize the coordination concerns arising from lower group density or 
when coordination concerns due to other group attributes may be eased by higher 
density.  
Multiple group attributes have been identified that correlate with coordination 
costs and difficulties in a group. Litwak and Hylton (1962) hypothesized that 
interorganizational coordination is influenced by 1) the level of interdependence 
between organizations; 2) organizations’ awareness about their interdependence; 3) 
standardization of organizational activities; and 4) the number of organizations 
involved. Here, I focus on the coordination difficulties arising from group size and 
interdependence among group members.  
If managed appropriately, group size may positively influence task 




risk sharing, decision making, etc. For example, Tian (2008) found that greater 
numbers of VC firms involved in the syndicate may help improve company 
performance. However, group size is also closely related to coordination needs and 
difficulties. According to Litwak and Hylton (1962), there is greater coordination 
required for larger group size. All other things being equal, coordination difficulties 
will increase, as a group gets larger.  
With the benefits and cost of group size, I expect a group to be formed in a 
way to maximize benefits while reducing cost. Thus, groups formed with lower 
density will tend to be smaller groups, as smaller group size may help ease the grea er 
coordination difficulties arising from lower density. Meanwhile, since trust can be a 
means of addressing coordination difficulties (Gulati & Singh, 1998) and trust often 
develops through prior relationships among organizations, higher group density may 
ease the coordination issues incurred by larger group size and enable groups to 
benefit from larger group size. Therefore, I expect,  
Hypothesis 2: The greater the group size, the more likely it is that firms will 
form groups with higher density.  
Firms form relationships with other firms to obtain complementary resources 
from their partners. The complementary resources of partners can be differnt s ts of 
knowledge, skills, and insights. For example, in the VC context, knowledge and 
insights play an important role in deal selection and value-added processes. Although 
the complementary resources may bring competitive advantage (Dyer & Singh, 
1998), the interdependence among partners with complementary sources may also be 




Since different experiences of firms often accumulate different knowledge and 
skills (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999) and various knowledge and skills are often 
complementary, one important manifestation of interdependence is experience 
heterogeneity. Heterogeneity in experiences may encourage collection of new 
information so that group members may better support their own opinions. It may 
also stimulate new and creative thinking while group members are trying to reconcil  
their conflicting viewpoints. Thus, firms may benefit from partnering with other firms 
with different experiences; such diversity in experience can enhance decision making 
(Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). However, firms with different experiences may 
make different judgments and have different goals. Heterogeneity in experience 
requires more coordination (Litwak & Hylton, 1962) and may increase coordination 
difficulties due to conflicts of interest (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Reagans & 
Zuckerman, 2001).  
Thus, similar to group size, experience heterogeneity is a double-edged sword. 
A group is more likely to be formed when the benefit group members obtained from 
experience heterogeneity will not be offset by the coordination difficulties arising 
from experience heterogeneity. Since both lower density and higher experience 
heterogeneity will increase coordination difficulties, the combination of lower group 
density and greater experience heterogeneity may exacerbate coordinati n problems. 
Coordination difficulties arising from lower group density will need to be allevi t d 
by greater experience homogeneity, while higher group density may help with the 




Hypothesis 3: The higher the group experience heterogeneity, the more likely 
it is that firms will form groups with higher density.  
Coalition concerns. When strategic decisions are made in a group, it is often a 
political process in which conflicting views and interested need to be settled through 
exercise of power (Eisenhardt & Bourgeois, 1988). However, the political process is 
neglected in the current network literature. In this essay, I incorporate the political-
process view to study group formation. I expect that the anticipated coalition 
formation, similar to the anticipated coordination difficulties, may also influe ce the 
formation of groups.  
Coalition formation is an important phenomenon in the political process. 
When multiple parties are involved and no single alternative can maximize the returns 
of all group members, a coalition is often formed to promote the interests of its 
members (Gamson, 1961). Thus, a coalition is defined as “two or more parties who 
cooperate to obtain a mutually desired outcome that satisfies the interests of the 
coalition rather than those of the entire group within which it is embedded” (Polzer, 
Mannix, & Neale, 1998). Unlike the concept of opportunism, a coalition involves 
more than two parties and is a collective action of coalition members. Moreover, 
coalition members do not have to pursue their own interests with guile. Since 
formation of a coalition among a subset of group members may jeopardize the 
interest of other group members that are excluded from the coalition, the concerns 





Although early research on coalitions regarded them as issue-based, 
temporary alliances (Gamson, 1961), recent research has suggested that a coalition
can be more stable than researchers originally thought and may span multiple issues 
(Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Polzer et al., 1998). Specifically, 
compatible interests and relationships among coalition members may increase th  
stability of the coalition. According to Polzer et al. (1998), parties with compatible 
interests are more likely to form a coalition to exclude other parties whose inter sts 
are not compatible. And, once a coalition based on compatible interests is formed, the 
cooperation is likely to increase the stability of the coalition and the identification of 
the coalition will not recede immediately after the issue is resolved.  
Given that a coalition could have certain stability, in this essay I combine 
network theory with the coalition formation argument based on interest compatibility 
and previous cooperation. I argue that network ties are a possible basis for coalition 
formation. Coalition formation is more likely to form between firms that have 
stronger ties. Research in network theory suggests that trust may emerge from 
repeated ties (Gulati, 1995b), that trust between partners will facilitate exchange and 
collective actions (Coleman, 1988), and that stronger ties are often associated with 
low-level conflict (Krackhardt & Stern, 1988; Nelson, 1989). Thus, I expect that 
firms with stronger ties are more likely to have compatible interests. Moreove , 
repeated ties provide an effective means to judge the capability of a potential partner
(Li & Rowley, 2002). The more frequently two firms form ties with each other, the 




strongly in a group are likely to form a coalition when there is a conflict of interest 
with other group members.  
All other things being equal, a coalition that includes a subset of group 
members while excluding other group members will lead to a power imbalance in the 
group. Concerns about power imbalance and formation of such a coalition may 
prevent the group formation. Since network ties are the basis of coalition formation 
and a coalition is more likely to form between firms with stronger ties, such a 
coalition and a power imbalance is likely to occur when lower group density and 
stronger ties coexist in a group. When stronger ties coincide with lower group 
density, it is more likely for the strongly connected firms to form a coalition that 
exclude other group members with whom they do not have connections. On the other 
hand, although tie strength may facilitate the formation of a coalition, such coalition 
is less likely to form between firms with stronger ties and exclude other group 
members in a group with higher density, because network closure can also facilitate 
trust (Coleman, 1988, 1990) and enable “the joining of individual interests for the 
pursuit of common initiatives” (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). So, groups with higher 
density are less likely to be affected by the concerns about coalition and power 
imbalance. Thus, 
Hypothesis 4: The stronger the maximum tie strength among potential group 






To study the group formation, I used the context of venture capital (VC) 
syndicates. VC firms often syndicate to fund start-up companies. Research has found 
that VC syndication can diversify risks involved in deals (Manigart et al., 2006), 
improve the selection process through information sharing (Lerner, 1994), and help 
start-up companies succeed through value-added services (Brander, Amit, & 
Antweiler, 2002; Tian, 2008). Equally, it has been found that syndicates carry 
coordination difficulties that offset some of the benefits (Wright & Lockett, 2003).  
VC syndication offers a fitting context for my study for a number of reasons. 
First, VC investment deals often involve more than two VC firms in a syndicate, 
making group perspective necessary and helpful. Second, although the process of 
decision making regarding a syndicate formation cannot be observed, the final 
commitment to form a first-round syndicate is always made by the participating firms 
in the knowledge that every other group members will be on board.2 Third, 
syndication is important to VC firms. Success of current investment will improve 
their chances for future deals. Also, research found that syndicating partners play an 
important role in each other’s investing behaviors (Guler, 2007). Fourth, VC 
syndication has significant impact on start-up companies. Tian (2008), for example, 
found that companies backed by VC syndicates performed better than those backed 
                                                
2
 As discussed in the VC deal of Vermeer by Ferguson (1999), even though Matrix Partner and Sigma 
Partners had expressed interest in Vermeer at different point of time, each of the proposals was 
contingent on finding two other co-investors. It was only in the finalized first-round deal that the 
three VC investors, including Atlas Venture, made final commitment about the investment with the 




by a single VC. Fifth, although VC syndication is an important phenomenon, it is still 
not clear how VC syndicate groups get formed. Therefore, it is necessary and 
interesting to dig into the formation of VC syndicates as groups.  
I tested hypotheses in this essay using data on VC investments in start-up 
companies between 1985 and 2008. The Venture Expert database constitutes my 
primary data source. To prepare my analysis sample, I constructed a sample of real 
syndicate groups using the following procedures. First, to ensure that VC firms made 
participation decisions based on the identities of all of the other VC firms in the 
syndicate and that all VC firms in a syndicate made their final commitments 
simultaneously, I only focused on the first-round syndicates. A first-round syndicate 
is defined as a syndicate formed when a group of VCs first join each other for a 
specific start-up company. Second, since the main focus of VC syndicates is to back 
up start-up companies and dynamics of group cooperation may differ based on 
whether companies formed first syndicates as young or mature companies, I limited 
the study to U.S.-based companies that were less than ten years old. Third, since first-
round syndicates that were at “Startup/Seed” stage, “Early Stage”, or “Expansion” 
stage accounted for 90 percent in the sample and cooperation within VC syndicates at 
these stages are more important, I only concentrated on the first-round syndicates at 
these stages and excluded those first-round syndicates at “Later Stage”, 
“Buyout/Acquisition” stage, or “Others” stage. Fourth, because the cross board 
investing behaviors of foreign VC firms are different in many ways from the 
investing behaviors of U.S. VC firms in the United States, I focused only on the U.S. 




for U.S. start-up companies that involved any foreign VC firms only accounted for 
less than 10 percent, so the whole syndicates that involved any foreign VC firms we e 
excluded. Fifth, due to the difference between angel investors and VC firms, angels 
were excluded from the analysis. The exclusion of angels did not change the number
of start-up companies included in the sample. During the period between 1985 and 
2008, there were 6,216 U.S.-based companies having first-round syndicate formed by 
identifiable VC firms.3  4,982 of those were start-up companies less than 10 years old. 
4,514 start-up companies were in “Startup/Seed” stage, “Early Stage”, or 
“Expansion” stage. Of those, 3,830 U.S.-based start-up companies were invested 
totally by U.S. VC firms. 
Consistent with prior research that studies tie formation (Hallen, 2008; Jensen, 
2003; Sorenson & Stuart, 2008), I adopted the choice-based sampling approach. 
Different from prior research on tie formation that used the choice-based sampling 
approach, I generated and matched hypothetical groups rather than hypothetical dyads 
for each start-up company. The sample of real syndicate groups is combined with a 
random sample of hypothetical syndicates that could have but did not form. Although 
I could have included all the potential hypothetical syndicate groups, including a 
random sample of hypothetical syndicates has two advantages. First, it is more 
computationally tractable. Including all hypothetical syndicates may generate 
computation difficulties. Second, it helps to reduce the autocorrelation among 
                                                
3 Since some VC firms involved in the syndicates were identified as undisclosed firms, I dropped the 
first-round syndicates with any undisclosed VC firms. While generally only one or two VC firms 
were not disclosed, it is theoretically important to drop such rounds as the inter-group ties of the 




analyzed groups, since each VC firm would have appeared in the sample for many 
more times if I had included all the possible syndicate groups.  
To construct the random sample of hypothetical syndicates, I first generatd a 
potential VC pool for each start-up company, which included all the potential U.S. 
VC investors that invested in the same industry, in the same state, in the same year, 
and the same quarter. Any VC firm in the pool could have invested in the focal start-
up company. Although I realized that a hypothetical VC firm could be a VC firm that 
was interested in the focal start-up company but ultimately invested in another start-
up company in a different state, using geographic limitation could effectively control 
for other possible factors that might have confounded the main focus of the essay. 
After establishing the potential VC firm pool for each real investment case,I 
generated matched samples by randomly selecting VC firms from the potential VC 
pool to form hypothetical syndicate groups of the same size. 4 Using a random 
selection in such a choice-based sampling may ensure that when I selected on th  
dependent variable, I would not select differently on the independent variables for the
real and matched samples. Based on the random selection method, a hypothetical 
syndicate group could be completely different from the real syndicate group, or it 
                                                
4 Since a hypothetical syndicate is generated based on a random combination of potential VCs in the 
pool, if the size of the hypothetical syndicates for a start-up company is not controlled, hypothetical 
syndicates with larger size will have a greater number of combinations and account for a higher 
portion in the hypothetical syndicate distribution f r the start-up company. This will make it difficult 
to select a number of representative hypothetical syndicates for the start-up company, since a 
random selection will result in an overrepresentation of larger hypothetical syndicates in the matched 
sample. Moreover, although the group size is the same for the counterfactuals and for the real 
syndicate of each startup company, I am still able to test the moderating effect of group size using 
within group variation, because the variation of group formation is due to the interaction between 
group density and group size. Due to all these considerations, I only generated hypothetical 




could differ by just one VC firm, or two VC firms, etc. 5 Thus, this can be seen as a 
random draw from a potential syndicate population generated using ANY same-sized 
combination of VC firms in the pool. 6 For each real case, a maximum of five 
hypothetical syndicate groups were randomly selected. 7 These hypothetical 
syndicates were those groups that could have but did not form for the focal start-up 
company. Since sometimes the VC firms in the potential pool for a specific start-up 
company were exactly the same VC firms involved in the first-round syndicate and 
no extra VC firms were available, it was not possible to create any hypothetical 
groups for these syndicates and they were dropped from the sample. Thus, in my final 
sample with hypothetical groups, there were 3,349 U.S.-based start-up companies 
invested by U.S. VCs from 1985 to 2008, in which 42 percent companies have three 
or more VC firms in the first-round syndicates.8 Using this sample, I examine how 
VC syndicates get formed for these start-up companies.  
Consistent with previous research based on choice-based samples, I used a 
conditional logit model grouped on start-up companies to test the hypotheses (e.g., 
Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). The level of analysis is syndicate groups. Using choice-
based sampling and conditional logit allows me to explain the probability of a gr up
                                                
5 Since in some cases a lead VC can be identified, I also tested the sensitivity of the matched sample 
by holding the identified lead VC constant in generating matched hypothetical cases. The results 
based on the matched sample in this method were similar to the one in which no lead VC is 
identified and considered.  
6 Since random selection of groups may generate syndicates with VC firms of different sizes, I also 
used different seeds in computer simulation to generate hypothetical syndicates as a verification of 
the sample sensitivity. 
7 Less than 5% of start-up companies in the sample do not have five hypothetical syndicates due to the 
small size of some potential VC pools. However, to verify the results, I also tested the hypotheses 
using a matched sample with three hypothetical syndicate groups for each real case. The results held 
constant. 
8
 Although half of the sample is syndicates of two firms, it is very important to apply group 
perspective to such a sample. Since as long as syndicates of two are mixed with multi-firm 
syndicates in a sample, group perspective will help to distinguish the tie formations involved in 




of VC firms forming a syndicate for a certain start-up company. The hypothesized 
relationships are shown as interaction terms between syndicate density and other 
independent variables. Such an empirical design offers a way to ensure the 
simultaneous determination of syndicate density and other group attributes. Because 
some explanatory variables do not vary within a group, these variables will be 
dropped from the models and their main effects are not estimated. Although 
Echambadi and Hess (2007) suggested that mean-centering does not reduce 
multicollinearity caused by interaction terms, I used mean-centered indepe nt 
variables when putting interaction terms into the regressions for interpretative 
purpose. 
Measures 
Syndicate formation. Since I estimated the probability that a certain syndicate 
group will form, the dependent variable in my analysis is the formation of a specific 
syndicate group, with 1 referring to a syndicate group formed in reality and 0 
referring to a hypothetical syndicate group.  
Syndicate density. This essay examines group formation by focusing on the 
role of group density. Group density is used to illustrate how prior relationships 
among potential group members may influence the formation of groups. In the VC 
syndication context, syndicate density was measured by the proportion of preexisting 
ties to the possible ties in a syndicate based on tie history from 1962. A tie was 
established when two VC firms syndicated in the same round for the same company. 




Industry competition. My first hypothesis argued that the formation of groups 
with different density levels varies with environmental competition. Previous 
literature has used the number of competitors to measure the degree of competiti n 
(Baker, Faulkner, & Fisher, 1998; Sakakibara, 2002). Since this essay emphasizes the 
pressure from new entrants in an industry, I used the number of VC firms newly 
entering into the industry of the focal start-up company in the previous year to 
measure competition. The more entrants in the previous year coming into the 
industry, the more competitive the industry is. Due to the skewness of this variable, I 
used log-transformed industry competition. To verify the results, I also applied a 
second measure, which counted the total number of VC firms in the start-up company 
industry, in the analysis and found robust results.  
Syndicate size. My second hypotheses claimed that groups with different 
density levels form in a way that coordination concerns will be managed using group 
size. In the VC context, syndicate size was measured by the total number of VC firms 
involved. The greater number of VC firms in a syndicate group indicates a larger 
syndicate size.  
VC experience heterogeneity. In the third hypotheses, I proposed that groups 
form in a way that coordination concerns will be managed using both group density 
and experience heterogeneity. To calculate VC experience heterogeneity, I firs  
calculated the standard deviation of VC firm experience within a syndicate group. 
However, the standard deviation of VC firm experience might vary depending on 
those VC firms’ average experience. Therefore, following prior literature (e.g., 




as the measure of VC experience heterogeneity and calculated the coefficient of 
variation by dividing its standard deviation by its average experience. The VC 
experience used in the heterogeneity calculation was measured as both VC total 
experience and VC industrial experiences. VC total experience was calculated in 
three ways: the total number of companies a VC firm has invested until the previous 
year, the total number of deals invested until the previous year, the total number of 
years investing as a VC firm. Correspondently, three measures of VC industrial 
experience were also tested: the number of companies a VC firm invested in th  focal 
industry of a focal company, the number of deals it invested in the focal industry of a 
focal company, and the number of years investing in the focal industry of a focal 
company.  Due to the limitation of the scope, only results measured by total 
experience using number of companies will be shown. Results were consistent when 
other measures of experiences were used.  
Maximum tie strength. My fourth hypotheses argued that groups with different 
density will form when coalition concerns that may be caused by strong ties is
minimized. Tie strength was measured by the number of co-investments in same 
syndicates between any two VC firms since 1962. Maximum tie strength was ten 
calculated as the maximum of tie strength of all pairs of VC firms in a syndicate. 
VC type heterogeneity. In order to have a more complete view of first-round 
VC syndicates, I included not only independent VC firms, but also other types of VC 
firms, such as corporate venture capitalist, bank affiliated VCs, etc. Based on rule of 
homophily, VC firms of similar types are more likely to join each other in a syndicate 




diversity has been measured using the entropy-based measure (Ancona & Caldwell, 
1992; Joshi & Roh, 2009; Teachman, 1980), I calculated VC type heterogeneity as 
∑Pi*ln(1/ Pi), where Pi is the percentage of a specific VC type in a syndicate.    
Average VC geographic distance. Since VC investments mainly focused on 
local market, VC firms that were close to each other geographically were more likely 
to join each other in syndication (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008). Therefore, I calculated 
average geographic distance among VC firms in a syndicate to control for this effect. 
Based on zip codes of VC firm offices, I found out corresponding latitudes and 
longitudes and then calculated the distance between two VC firms using spherical 
geometry. Because the variable average VC geographic distance was ske ed, I used 
its log transformation to correct the skewness.  
Average company-VC geographic distance. VC firms’ preference on local 
investments also means that a group of VC firms that are close to the target company 
are more likely to join in a syndicate. Therefore, I calculated average company-VC 
geographic distance in a syndicate to control for this effect, using similar ethod as 
for average VC geographic distance. Again, I used the log transformation to c rrect 
the skewness.  
Inside indirect tie density. Prior dyad-level research found that two firms were 
more likely to form a tie when there was an indirect tie between them (Gulati, 1995a; 
Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Hallen, 2008; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). In this essay, I 
distinguished whether the indirect tie is through a common third party inside or 
outside the syndicate. To calculate inside indirect tie density, I first identified whether 




indirect tie exists between two firms with a geodesic distance of two. Thus, if two 
firms have not co-invested with each other since 1962, but each of them has invested 
with a common third party, then these two firms have an indirect tie. After I counted 
the number the indirect ties that go through current syndicate members, I calculated 
the proportion of such inside indirect ties by dividing it by total possible ties in a 
syndicate. For a syndicate of two, I assigned inside indirect tie density to be zero. 
Consistent with prior dyad level literature, I expect a group is more likely to form 
when inside indirect tie density is higher, since a firm inside the group is more likely 
to introduce two firms that did not have previous ties into a group. 
Outside indirect tie density. Similarly, I calculated the proportion of outside 
indirect ties going through firms outside of the focal syndicate group. Again, I regard 
a geodesic distance of two as an indirect tie. After identifying the indirect ties through 
firms outside of the focal syndicate group, I calculated the proportion of outside 
indirect ties by dividing it by total possible ties in a syndicate. Different from prior 
dyad research, I expect that the likelihood of group formation will actually decrease 
when an indirect tie exists through firms outside of the focal syndicate group, since 
firms will not be willing to lose the bridging role by introducing two unfamiliar f rms 
to tie with each other if the firm itself is not involved in the group.  
VC performance heterogeneity. Initial Public Offering (IPO) has been the 
most desirable exit channel for VC firms investing in start-up companies. Therefore, 
the performance of a VC firm has been traditionally measured by the number of IPOs 
achieved by the VC firm (e.g. Gompers & Lerner, 1999). Similar to VC experience 




the within-group heterogeneity in performance. As suggested by the homophily 
argument, I expect that VC firms with similar performances are more likely to tie 
with each other. Since acquisition is another attractive exit for VC firms, I al o 
calculated a second measure of VC performance using the number of acquisitions 
achieved by a VC firm in the previous years. The VC performance heterogeneity 
calculated based on VC firm acquisition performance showed consistent results.  
Company age. Previous dyadic literature found that firms were more likely to 
tie with unfamiliar firms when setting uncertainty was low (e.g., Sorenson & Stuart, 
2008). Expecting this effect to hold also at group level, I controlled for the effect of 
setting uncertainty in my estimation of group formation. Since developmental stage of 
a start-up company influences uncertainty level in a VC syndicate, I used company 
age as proxy of setting uncertainty (Hallen, 2008). Typically, an older company 
indicates a more developed stage, while a younger age represents an undeveloped 
stage.  
Results 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2, respectively, show the descriptive statistics and the 
correlation between any two variables in my sample. As shown in Table 1.1, there is 
about 1% missing values in the variable average company-VC geographic distance 
and 3.6% missing observations in the variable average VC geographic distance. 
Although the proportion of missing value is very low, I still controlled for the 
possible effect of these missing values by generating dummy variables to identify the 
missing observations on each variable. This is because deleting the observations with 




with only hypothetical syndicates groups. In that case, in order to use this choice-
based sample I would have had to exclude all the companies missing either 
hypothetical groups or real syndicate groups, which might have incurred a greater
amount of data loss. 
Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Syndicate formation 19683 0.170 0.376 0 1 
Syndicate density 19683 0.258 0.383 0 1 
Industry competition 19683 3.674 1.065 0 5.938 
Syndicate size 19683 2.661 1.003 2 11 
VC exp heterogeneity 19683 0.953 0.435 0 3 
Max tie strength (ln) 8250 1.046 1.146 0 4.804 
VC type heterogeneity 19683 0.358 0.376 0 1.792 
Avg VC geograhic dist (ln) 18978 5.877 2.250 0 8.511 
Avg com-VC geo dist (ln) 19551 5.947 1.711 0 7.905 
Inside indirect tie density 19683 0.022 0.078 0 0.60  
Outside indirect tie density 19683 0.443 0.429 0 1 
VC perf heterogeneity 19683 0.940 0.687 0 3 






Table 1.2: Correlation Table  
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Syndicate formation 1.000         
2 VC type heterogeneity -0.067 1.000        
3 Avg VC geograhic dist (ln) -0.123 0.044 1.000       
4 Avg VC geo dist miss dummy 0.002 0.055 -0.411 1.000      
5 Avg com-VC geo dist (ln) -0.140 0.071 0.705 -0.097 1.000     
6 Avg com-VC geo dist miss dummy 0.002 0.016 -0.029 -0.061 -0.079 1.000    
7 Inside indirect tie density 0.048 -0.039 -0.025 0.00  -0.019 0.001 1.000   
8 Outside indirect tie density -0.142 0.013 0.054 -0.009 0.047 0.009 -0.063 1.000  
9 VC perf heterogeneity -0.039 -0.023 0.026 -0.004 0.04  -0.020 -0.013 0.146 1.000 
10 VC exp heterogeneity -0.020 0.063 0.031 0.000 0.027 -0.012 -0.076 -0.065 0.340 
11 Syndicate density  0.175 -0.103 -0.102 -0.017 -0.069 -0.016 0.205 -0.560 -0.026 
12 Syn density*Company stage -0.044 0.022 0.011 0.011 0.020 0.009 0.003 0.020 -0.001 
13 Syn density*Ind competition  0.015 0.016 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.010 0.142 0.042 
14 Syn density*Syndicate size  -0.040 0.037 0.059 0.016 0.035 0.018 0.212 0.347 -0.033 
15 Syn density*Exp heterogeneity -0.053 0.056 0.031 0.023 0.024 0.008 0.013 0.357 0.035 
16 Max tie strength (ln) 0.189 -0.125 -0.088 -0.012 -0.057 -0.013 0.227 -0.394 -0.072 
17 Syn density*Max tie strength  0.179 -0.104 -0.078 -0.009 -0.049 -0.008 0.110 -0.308 -0.103 
 
  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
10 VC exp heterogeneity 1.000        
11 Syndicate density  -0.254 1.000       
12 Syn density*Company stage 0.015 -0.032 1.000      
13 Syn density*Ind competition  0.041 -0.144 -0.030 1.000     
14 Syn density*Syndicate size  0.097 -0.544 -0.002 0.06  1.000    
15 Syn density*Exp heterogeneity -0.007 -0.384 0.023 0.115 0.320 1.000   
16 Max tie strength (ln) -0.250 0.742 -0.045 -0.122 -0.222 -0.305 1.000  





Before testing the hypothesis in the essay, I first show five baseline modls 
using conditional logit regressions in Table 1.3. As expected, VC type heterogeneity, 
average com-VC geographic distance, and average VC geographic distance all 
negatively influence syndicate formation. While the non-significance of average com-
VC geographic distance missing dummy suggests that missing values in the variable 
of average com-VC geographic distance will not influence the results, the average VC 
geographic distance missing dummy is significant and successfully captures the 
potential effect of missing values in the variable average VC geographic distance. 
Consistent to my expectation, I find that inside indirect tie density has a positive 
effect on the formation of syndicates, while outside indirect tie density has a negative 
impact. These interesting results are another evidence of tie correlation. It shows that 
a firm joining a group is more likely to introduce two firms that did not have previous 
ties into the group, while a firm outside of the focal group is less likely to do so. 
Firms are not willing to forego their ‘bridging’ role by introducing two unfamiliar 




























        + p < .1, *p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
 Model_1 Model_2 Model_3 Model_4 Model_5 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
 DV: Syndicate formation      
VC type heterogeneity -0.413*** -0.404*** -0.409***        -0.356*** -0.353*** 
        (0.060)       (0.060)       (0.060)       (0.060)       (0.060) 
Avg VC geograhic dist -0.064*** -0.063***        -0. 64*** -0.048*** -0.049*** 
        (0.013)       (0.013)       (0.013)       (0.013)       (0.013) 
Avg VC geo dist miss dummy      -0.396**      -0.393**      -0.394**     -0.291*   -0.286* 
        (0.125)       (0.125)       (0.125)       (0.126)       (0.126) 
Avg com-VC geo dist         -0.132***       -0.132*** -0.131***        -0.140*** -0.139*** 
        (0.018)       (0.018)       (0.018)       (0.018)       (0.018) 
Avg com-VC geo dist miss dummy -0.395 -0.410 -0.420 -0.273 -0.239 
  (0.475) (0.475) (0.475) (0.486) (0.489) 
Inside indirect tie density        1.139***        1.090***        1.101***   0.545*    0.554* 
        (0.262)       (0.263)       (0.263)      (0.267)       (0.267) 
Outside indirect tie density       -0.845***       -0.850***       -0.838***      -0.384*** -0.383*** 
        (0.051)       (0.051)       (0.051)      (0.066)       (0.066) 
VC exp heterogeneity   -0.105* -0.079        0.194*** 0.198*** 
         (0.048) (0.051)      (0.058)       (0.058) 
VC perf heterogeneity   -0.051       -0.152*** -0.153*** 
    (0.035)      (0.036)       (0.036) 
Syndicate density           0.809*** 0.807*** 
          (0.071)       (0.071) 
Syn density*Company stage     -0.116*** 
            (0.026) 
       
chi2 df_m 718.086 722.891 725.059 857.455 877.902 
N 19683 19683 19683 19683 19683 
p 8.70E-151 8.40E-151 2.80E-150 9.10E-178 3.50E-181 
ll -5549.854 -5547.452 -5546.367 -5480.170 -5469.946 




Furthermore, results of both experience heterogeneity and performance 
heterogeneity agree with my previous discussion. Although VC experience 
heterogeneity is negatively related to group formation in Model 2, the coefficient 
turns out to be positive and consistent with my expectation after syndicate density and 
VC performance heterogeneity are controlled in Model 4. Consistent to the findings 
in the dyad-level research, I find syndicate density increases the probability of 
syndicate formation. Based on previous literature, setting uncertainty as measured by 
company age is also controlled in Model 5. Syndicates with lower density are more 
likely to form in older start-up companies where setting uncertainty is lower, while
higher density syndicates are likely to be formed when startup companies are 
younger. 
Based on baseline models, I tested the hypotheses using conditional logit 
regressions and show the results in Table 1.4. From Model 6 to Model 9, I added 
independent variables and their related interaction terms one at a time. The main 
effects of independent variables are not shown in the models, since they were dropped 
out of the regressions due to lack of variation within groups. In Model 10, variables 
related to the first three hypotheses were inputted, while variables regarding 
hypothesis 1-4 were all included in Model 11. Since hypotheses 4 only applies for 












  Model_6 Model_7 Model_8 Model_9 Model_10 Model_11 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
        
DV: Syndicate formation       
VC type heterogeneity -0.356*** -0.346*** -0.358***   -0.206* -0.353***    -0.216* 
      (0.060)     (0.061)     (0.060)     (0.090)     (0.061)     (0.090) 
Avg VC geograhic dist -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.049***    -0.052+ -0.050***   -0.053+ 
      (0.013)   (0.0132)     (0.013)     (0.031)     (0.013)     (0.031) 
Avg VC geo dist miss dummy -0.281*  -0.302* -0.293*  -0.302*  
     (0.126)     (0.126)     (0.126)      (0.126)  
Avg com-VC geo dist  -0.139*** -0.138*** -0.139***   -0.171*** -0.138*** -0.171*** 
     (0.018)     (0.018)     (0.018)     (0.042)     (0.018)     (0.042) 
Avg com-VC geo dist miss dummy      -0.234 -0.300      -0.241 -1.382 -0.298       -1.395 
     (0.491)     (0.490)     (0.489)     (0.913)     (0.492)     (0.921) 
Inside indirect tie density       0.534*       -0.267   0.486+  0.061      -0.343 -0.105 
     (0.267)     (0.288)     (0.268)     (0.299)     (0.289)     (0.303) 
Outside indirect tie density -0.408*** -0.395*** -0.416*** -0.889*** -0.444*** -0.969*** 
     (0.066)     (0.065)     (0.067)     (0.139)     (0.066)     (0.140) 
VC perf heterogeneity -0.158*** -0.135*** -0.157***      -0.132* -0.143*** -0.125* 
     (0.036)     (0.037)     (0.036)    (0.058)     (0.037)     (0.058) 
VC exp heterogeneity 0.194*** 0.205***       0.179**       0.312**      0.188**      0.317** 
     (0.058)     (0.058)      (0.058)    (0.106)     (0.058)     (0.106) 
Syndicate density  0.808*** 1.132*** 0.843*** 0.771*** 1.161***   0.452+ 
     (0.071)     (0.082)     (0.072)     (0.217)     (0.082)     (0.235) 
Syn density*Company stage -0.111*** -0.110*** -0.117*** -0.119* -0.105*** -0.101+ 
     (0.026)     (0.026)     (0.026)      (0.059)     (0.026)    (0.059) 
Syn density*Ind competition (H1) 0.266***    0.281***       0.451*** 
     (0.060)        (0.060)    (0.134) 
Syn density*Syndicate size (H2)  0.752***   0.751*** 0.606*** 
       (0.094)       (0.094)     (0.182) 
Syn density*Exp heterogeneity (H3)          0.359**      0.250*   0.614* 








          + p < .1, *p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
Max tie strength    0.171***       0.137** 
         (0.045)       (0.046)  
Syn density*Max tie strength (H4)    0.152     0.244* 
         (0.097)      (0.106)  
        
chi2 df_m 897.609 944.656 886.825 474.608 971.538 504.099 
N 19683 19683 19683 8250 19683 8250 
p 1.90E-184 1.50E-194 3.90E-182 5.58E-94 2.00E-198 7.68E-98 
ll -5460.092 -5436.569 -5465.485 -2236.514 -5423.128 -2221.769 




Industry competition was introduced in Model 6. In Hypothesis 1, I argued 
that a densely connected group is more likely to form when environment is more 
competitive. As indicated in Model 6, Model 10 & 11, Hypothesis 1 is supported. The 
interaction term between syndicate density and industry competition is positive and 
significant in all three models. Based on Model 6, increasing group density from 0.4 
to 0.6 when industry competition is one standard deviation above the mean will 
increase the likelihood of group formation by one third compared to when industry 
competition is at the mean.  
Model 7 added the interaction between syndicate density and syndicate size. 
According to Hypothesis 2, firms need to balance increasing coordination difficulties 
arising from larger group size and caused by lower group density in a group 
formation. Thus, syndicates with higher density are more likely to be in largergroups, 
while syndicates with lower density are more likely form with a smaller number of 
participants. Consistent with my expectation, I find support for Hypothesis 2 in 
Models 7, 10 and 11. With a one-unit increase of group size, the formation likelihood 
of a group with a density of 0.6 would increase more than two times as much as a 
group with a density of 0.4.  
In Model 8, I introduced the interacting effects of syndicate density with VC 
experience heterogeneity. As expected in hypothesis 3, I find that the great r the VC 
experience heterogeneity, the higher the formation likelihood of denser groups. 
Although only results based on experience measured by total number of companies a 
VC firm has invested before is shown in Models 8, 10 and 11, all other experience 




increases from 0.4 to 0.6, the increase in group-formation probability when VC 
experience heterogeneity is one standard deviation above the mean is 30 percent more 
than when it is at the mean.  
In Model 9 the interacting term between maximum tie strength and syndicate 
density was included. In Hypothesis 4, I argued that the greater the maximum tie 
strength among potential group participants, the more likely to form a group with 
higher density. Although this effect was not significant in Model 9, I found support 
for this hypothesis in Model 11. If maximum tie strength among potential group 
participants increases by one standard deviation, then the increase in probability of 
formation of a group with a density of 0.6 is one and a half times that of a group with 
a density equal to 0.4. Following the suggestions of Hoetker (2007), I graphed the 
interaction effects in the four hypotheses in Figure 1.3. As expected, the graphsshow 




















To verify the effect of industry competition, I conducted some additional 
analyses. First, industry heat is positively correlated with industry competition. It 
could be that industry heat, rather than industry competition, is influential. To ensure 
the effect of industry competition and distinguish it from industry heat effect, I 
included industry heat in my analysis. Industry heat was measured in two ways: 1) the 
total number of companies receiving VC funding in the start-up company industry in 
the previous year (i.e., industry heat - company); 2) the total number of IPOs in the 
start-up company industry in the previous year (i.e., industry heat - IPO). I tested the 
effect of industry competition and industry heat based on Model 6, Model 10, and 
Model 11. Using both measures, I found that the moderating effect of industry heat 
was significant when put in the regression without the interaction term between 
industry competition and syndicate density, but lost significance when the latter is 
added. This provides some support to my industry competition argument.  
Second, another alternative explanation could be that the greater the 
competitive entries in the previous year, the greater the availability of past partners. 
In order to rule out this alternative explanation, I also measured industry competition 
using the number of entries in the focal year. Again, the hypothesized relationship 
held constant.  
A third analysis regarding industry competition effect tested the composition 
of syndicates in a more competitive environment. I used entrant percentage, i.e., the 
percentage of new VC entrants to the start-up company industry in the focal 
syndicate, as the measure of syndicate composition. I tested not only the effect of th  




effect of the interaction of their square terms. I found that the new entrant percentage 
in a syndicate in high competitive environment was either lower or higher. This is 
consistent with my argument about environmental competition and legitimacy 
expectation, since a higher percentage of entrants also suggested that incumbents se 
denser groups to reduce competitive entries so that new entrants have to syndicate 
among themselves to enter the industry of the start-up company. This effect held even 
after I added the interaction term between industry competition and syndicate densi y. 
When similar analysis was conducted based on Model 11 or groups with more than 
two VC firms, the inverted U effect disappeared. Thus, only in syndicates of two will 
new entrants with previous connections form a dense syndicate in a new industry 
when environment is more competitive.   
To test how the hypothetical relationships may vary with group size, I 
conducted separate analyses on subsamples with syndicate sizes equal to two, three, 
or four and greater than four. As shown in Table 1.5, the two dummy variables that 
are responsible for controlling for the effect of missing values on geographic distance 
variables were dropped in some models due to high collinearity. Interestingly, 
industry competition is only associated with the new syndicate relationship formati n 
in smaller syndicate groups with two or three VC firms, but not in larger syndicate 
groups. A possible explanation could be that it is easier for firms to quickly form and 
operate a smaller dense group with past partners in a more competitive environment. 
Larger groups with higher density will take longer to form and make strategic 
decisions, which may to some extent offset the benefits of higher density in a 




firms participate, forming new ties is even more provocative in a highly competitive 
environment. Therefore, it is not too surprising to find that industry competition only 
has a moderating effect in a smaller group. Another interesting result is about the 
interaction effect between VC experience heterogeneity and syndicate density. This 
relationship is only significant in larger groups with four or more VC firms, which 
indicates that interdependence may only increase coordination difficulties when the 
group size is larger.  Coordination difficulties due to interdependence among group 





Table 1.5: Separate Analysis Based on Subsamples 
 
  Model_12 Model_13 Model_14 
 Group of Two Group of Three 
Group of Four 
or more 
  b/se b/se b/se 
DV: Syndicate formation    
VC type heterogeneity -0.466*** -0.275*      -0.071 
    (0.083)   (0.112)    (0.156) 
Avg VC geograhic dist -0.044**    -0.051      -0.071 
    (0.015)   (0.033)    (0.093) 
Avg VC geograhic dist miss dummy    -0.242+   
    (0.129)   
Avg com-VC geo dist  -0.130*** -0.179***      -0.122 
    (0.020)   (0.046)    (0.111) 
Avg com-VC geo dist miss dummy      0.110     -1.662     10.117 
    (0.531)   (1.021) (595.893) 
Outside indirect tie density -0.293*** -0.707*** -1.882*** 
    (0.076)   (0.162)     (0.293) 
VC exp heterogeneity 0.133+      0.216+       0.545** 
    (0.069)    (0.128)     (0.194)  
VC perf heterogeneity     -0.152** -0.174*      -0.064 
    (0.047)    (0.072)     (0.100) 
Syndicate density 0.721***    0.736**        0.230 
    (0.082)   (0.246)     (0.756) 
Syn density*Company stage -0.104***     -0.048    -0.325* 
    (0.029)   (0.066)     (0.131) 
Syn density*Ind competition 0.243***   0.455** 0.395 
    (0.068)   (0.151)     (0.299) 
Syn density*Exp heterogeneity      0.214      0.559     1.221+ 
    (0.135)   (0.344)     (0.653) 
Inside indirect tie density     -0.159        0.177 
     (0.370)     (0.541) 
Max tie strength    0.181** 0.088 
     (0.059)     (0.077) 
Syn density*Max tie strength      0.140    0.459* 
     (0.123)     (0.215) 
Syn density*Syndicate size   0.504 
        (0.348) 
     
chi2 df_m 522.867 322.684 213.131 
N 11433 5286 2964 
p 3.00E-104 2.17E-60 4.51E-37 
ll -3173.646 -1425.253 -780.657 
r2_p 0.076 0.102 0.120 




Discussion and Conclusion 
In this essay, I examine how inter-firm groups get formed. Unlike the prior 
literature that focused on dyad level, I study group formation from a group 
perspective. The dyad-level research has assumed focal ties independent of other
group participants. In this essay, I take into consideration the fact that one tie 
formation may influence the formation of another tie in the same group and 
simultaneously examine all tie formation involved in a group. Further, different from 
the dyad-level research that only focused on tie histories of the focal firm and/or the 
focal partner, this essay emphasizes that one tie formation might be related to the tie 
histories among other partners in the group. So, it examines the impact of prior 
relationships among all potential group members. Specifically, It explains how 
potential group members may get together either through path dependence or path 
breaking and how group density based on the prior ties among potential group 
members may influence group formation together with external or internal situ tions. 
Using venture capital investment data from 1985 to 2008, I find that syndication 
groups are formed in a way that better adapts to the environment and better manages 
the internal cooperation.  
Connecting group density with environmental adaptation, I argue that the 
more competitive the environment, the more likely it is that firm will form a group 
with higher density, since higher density helps the group adapt to greater competitive 
uncertainty, engage in fast decision making, and comply to the legitimacy expectation 
in a more competitive environment. Although the prior research at the dyad level has 




environment is more competitive, no empirical evidence is provided. More important, 
dyadic research neglected one important issue—not all new ties between new part rs 
will be influenced by environmental competition. The negative influence of 
environment on new tie formation depends on the group situation, i.e., whether there 
are other firms involved in the group and how other group participants are previously 
connected. I argue that firms’ greater preference for past partners in a more 
competitive environment comes from higher group density. It is high-density groups 
that may reduce partner-specific uncertainty and facilitate fast decision making; past 
ties in a low-density group will not be very helpful in uncertainty reduction and 
speeded-up decision making. Furthermore, it is the new tie formation involved in a 
lower-density group that may be negatively influenced by legitimacy judgment when 
competition is greater. Groups with higher density are perceived to be more 
legitimate when dense networks are expected as entry barriers.  
Besides the linkage with environmental adaptation, I also link group density 
with internal cooperation process. I argue that group density may influence both 
cooperation difficulties and cooperation willingness. First, group density may 
demonstrate different levels of coordination difficulties such that important group 
attributes, e.g., group size and group heterogeneity, will have to be simultaneously 
adjusted in a group formation to minimize coordination difficulties. Thus, groups 
with lower density will form in smaller groups or groups with less heterogeneity, 
since coordination difficulties arising from lower density can be eased by smaller 




groups or more heterogeneous groups, as higher density can improve the coordination 
issues caused by larger group size or greater heterogeneity.  
Although the impact of group size on tie formation has been studied on a 
dyadic level, group level analysis in this essay has shown a completely diff rent 
prediction. Also using VC investment data, Sorenson and Stuart (2008) found that 
distant ties between two VC firms were more likely to form in larger syndicates, since 
the uncertainty brought by the distant focal partner would be smaller when group size 
was larger. However, when shifting the analysis from a dyadic level to a group level, 
I found that the smaller the group size, the more likely it is for firms to form groups 
with lower density. The reason behind the different predictions was the coordination 
issue arising from tie correlation. Since all tie formations in a group are cor lated 
and the group is the unit to pursue certain tasks, coordination is an important issue at 
the group level. Coordination between two partners is less meaningful when there are 
other firms involved in the same group. When coordination at group level and tie 
correlation in a group are taken into consideration, groups with lower density will be 
more likely to form in smaller groups, not in larger groups.  
Different from the finding regarding group size, the finding about group 
heterogeneity is consistent with the homophily hypothesis prevailed in dyadic level 
studies. However, despite the seemingly similar predictions, I believe that the driver 
under the relationship is coordination concerns, rather than simply homophily. If 
homophily is the underlying reason, then I should not have found the positive main 
effect of experience heterogeneity. This argument is also supported by the separated 




behind the relationship between group heterogeneity, group density, and group 
formation, the results should hold in all regressions with different group size. The fact 
that group heterogeneity only matters in larger groups implies that coordination 
difficulties are the source of this effect, since coordination difficulties arising from 
group heterogeneity and interdependence increase with group size. 
Second, group density may also incur concerns regarding coalition formation 
and power imbalance. Since network ties are a basis of coalition formation and strong 
ties may foster the formation of coalition, the coexistence of lower density and 
stronger ties may cause power imbalance. Thus, groups with higher density are more 
likely to form when stronger ties exist, while groups with lower density may form as 
weak ties coincide. Such network dynamics cannot be studied using the dyad 
approach. By including multiple relationships and multiple parties in the study, this 
essay displays dynamics in network formation by focusing on the coalition formati n 
within groups. The coalition argument in this essay suggests that competition and 
cooperation can coexist simultaneously and interplay with each other. Often when 
firms cooperate to benefit from resource interdependence, they still keep competiti n 
and power relationships in mind. 
In sum, this essay enhances our understanding of network formation. Taking a 
group perspective, this essay provides a way to capture the simultaneous 
commitments made in alliance or syndication formation and to examine how previous 
relationships among all group members may influence group formation. The group 
perspective enables me to reveal the group level logics that have been neglected in 




certain group attributes, such as group density, which are important to group 
outcomes.  
While contributing to the understanding of tie formation from a group 
perspective, this essay also highlights some important aspects of resource dependence 
theory that has been neglected in network formation literature. According to Casciaro 
and Piskorski (2005), the resource dependence theory has two aspects, mutual 
dependence and power imbalance. However, current dyadic literature in social 
network formation only emphasizes the mutual dependence side and argues that firms 
are more likely to tie with partners that have complimentary resources. Although the 
mutual dependence argument of resource dependence theory has helped our 
understanding of tie formation, it undermines the contribution of resource dependence 
theory to network formation literature. Taking a group perspective, this essayis able 
to demonstrate the impact of power imbalance on network formation with the 
illustration of coalition formation argument.  
Moreover, this essay also makes theoretical contribution by linking two 
important theoretical perspectives in network formation literature, resource 
dependence theory and social network theory. In the dyadic literature, while resource 
dependence theory has been adopted to explain the needs of tie formation, social 
network theory has been used to address the concerns in tie formation. However, the 
coalition argument in this essay bridges the two theoretical perspectives by 
suggesting the role of the social network in coalition formation and by linking 




Besides its contribution to network formation theory, this essay also 
contributes to the entrepreneurship literature by examining the formation of first-
round syndicates. VC syndicates have been an important phenomenon in the VC 
industry, but little is known in terms of how VC firms get together in the first place to 
back up a specific company. This essay focuses on an important group attribute, 
syndicate density, and explains how VC firms form syndicates. A clear and more 
complete understanding of how syndicate groups form will help VC firms become 
more conscious about how different factors may combine to influence the formation 
of network relationships. This essay suggests that VC firms exploring network 
relationships need to pay attention to environmental adaptation, coordination 
difficulties, and potential coalition issues.  
This essay has some limitations. First, the theoretical argument made in this 
essay has some boundary conditions. It only applies to the groups that are formed for 
certain business tasks and for a long-term purpose by several cooperating fims. It 
may not apply to the groups formed purely for learning purpose and superficial 
alliances, such as a research and development consortium. Second, the start-up 
company sample used in the essay may have limitations. To ensure firms make 
simultaneous final commitment regarding syndicate participation, I only focused on 
the companies having VC syndicates in their first rounds. Since it is possible that 
companies of higher qualities will be able to get more VC firms involved and 
companies backed up by a single VC in the first round may be relatively lower in 
quality, the companies included in the sample may be of higher quality on average. 




could not identify how the group density was distributed within the group and how a 
firm’s connections interplayed with its characteristics as well as other group 
members’ attributes. In the future, it is also interesting to take a closer look of inside 
the group to understand how the within-group distribution of prior ties may influence 
network formation.  
This essay also creates interesting opportunities for future research. First, 
future research may add context-rich qualitative evidences to the study of group 
formation. For example, anecdotal comments or stories in the VC industry may help 
our understanding of the process of syndicate formation. Second, based on the 
arguments about competition and group density, I may further explore how 
participating in groups of lower density may influence firms’ future tie formation. For 
example, it is interesting to examine whether simultaneously tying with too many
new partners will lead to cut off of past ties as well as less invitations fr m past 
partners, and whether such associations will be moderated by competition pressure. 
Or, future study may test whether the intensive competition among VC firms in a 
state or industry area may increase the average density of VC syndicates in the 
following year. Third, the hypothetical groups generated in this essay have t e same 
group size as the real case syndicate. Although the combination of various group 
density levels and certain group size enables the test of their interaction effect, we 
may generate hypothetical groups varying in group size for a certain real syndicate 
group. This adaptation has meanings in two folds. On the one hand, it may validate 
the results I obtained in this essay. On the other hand, it will enable the test of main 




positive interaction effect between group density and group size on group formation 
using a different design. This essay suggests that the formation of one new tieis 
related not only to the group size, but also to the other tie formations simultaneously 
involved in the same group setting. When the other ties in the group are mostly 
between past partners, a new tie is more likely to form in a larger group. However, 
while the other ties in the group are also between new partners, a new tie is mor
likely in a smaller group. Thus, future research may test the moderating effect of 
group size and group setting on the formation of a dyadic new tie. Fifth, in this essay, 
I controlled for the different effects of indirect ties depending on whether the third 
party is a potential group member. Subsequent research may empirically compare and 
contrast these effects with those found in earlier dyadic studies and nail down the 
specifics that cause such difference. Last, but not the least, VC syndicates are formed 
for specific startup companies. Founders of startup companies often play an important 
role in the syndicate formation. Therefore, it is interesting to examine how founders’ 
backgrounds may influence the formation of VC syndicates.  
Overall, this essay contributes to both the network formation literature and the 
research in entrepreneurship. With the novel empirical design, the new group 
perspective enables me to take tie correlation into consideration, uncover group-level 
formation mechanisms, and dig into group dynamics. Guided by the group 
perspective, the findings in this essay greatly enhance our understanding of sy dicate 
formation of VC firms.  




Essay II: Uncertainty in Value Creation and Value 
Appropriation: Group Participation of an Unfamiliar Firm 
Introduction 
Essay I has examined when firms form cooperating groups with various group 
density. Although the group perspective enables me to take tie correlation into 
consideration and study multiple tie formations simultaneously, using a group 
perspective alone may overlook some interesting specifics inside a group. Thus, in 
this second essay, I study group formation by combining a firm focus and a group 
perspective.  
Previous studies have found that firms prefer to form alliance or syndicates 
with the partners they worked with before (e.g., Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Gargiulo, 
1999; Li & Rowley, 2002). Despite this preference for past partners and repeated tis, 
research suggested that there are also benefits from partnering with ne  partners and, 
thus, firms are sometimes motivated to explore new ties (Baum et al., 2005; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). Some of the factors that have been found to drive the formation of 
inter-firm ties with new partners are: firm-specific uncertainty, firm-specific 
absorptive capacity, and firm performance. Firms facing high firm-specific 
uncertainty are more likely to form new ties (Beckman et al., 2004). Firms that 
accumulate absorptive capacity through working with old partners are likely to 
leverage this experience through tie formation with new partners (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). Further, firms become more open to new partners when their 




However, because firms cannot use their prior experience to evaluate the 
capability and reliability of new partners, they face higher uncertainty when tying 
with new partners. To reduce the uncertainty involved in tie formation with new 
partners, firms often use network background of a potential partner and their 
similarity (homophily) with potential partners as criteria to choose new partners with 
less uncertainty. For example, Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith (2005) studied 
the network expansion of dedicated biotech firms and found that when starting new 
tie attachment with unfamiliar firms of the same type, dedicated biotech firms were 
more likely to choose those most-connected firms. Using various homophily 
measures such as co-location, size-difference, etc., they also found that homophily 
usually held strongly in tie formation with new partners. Likewise, Shipilov, Rwley 
and Aharonson (2007) studied how investment banks initiate and terminate ties and 
found that it was more likely for investment banks to tie with new partners that they 
were indirectly connected through third-party ties or from same network cliques. In 
addition, they discovered that unfamiliar investment banks similar in both status and 
level of specification were more likely to form new ties with each other.  
Besides selecting new partners with less uncertainty, firms also tend to tie with 
new partners in less uncertain settings. Sorenson and Stuart (2008) argued that 
different settings influence the perceived need for familiarity and trust, hus impacting 
the characteristics of the ties.  Using VC syndicates as their settings, hey found that 
socially or industrially distant ties are more likely to form in less uncertain settings, 
such as syndicates for more mature companies, syndicates with smaller size, o




Despite the important contributions of these studies, there are still some 
limitations in the existing research. First, the current literature on new tie formation 
only focuses on the dyad formation involving partners new to each other. However, in 
a multi-firm group, a partner may be new to more than one firm. Then, the 
uncertainty brought by the partner is not determined by the partner’s relationship with 
one firm alone. Instead, the uncertainty and unfamiliarity brought by a partner may 
vary with the partner’s relationships with all other firms. Only when we consider all 
ties together can we better understand the impact of partner uncertainty on tie 
formation.  
A second limitation in the current literature is related to setting attribu es. In the 
prior research (Sorenson & Stuart, 2008), setting uncertainty has largely been 
regarded as predetermined before tie formation. However, in a setting involving 
multiple firms, setting uncertainty could co-evolve with the tie formation in the 
setting. Once group members are assumed, the uncertainty in the setting will be 
determined. Meanwhile, the group will be finalized if setting uncertainty is 
considered under control. Therefore, the uncertainty brought by a new partner 
interacts with the setting uncertainty to influence group formation. The tie formations 
in a group co-evolve with the setting uncertainty. Such co-evolution and in-group 
dynamic have been overlooked in the prior literature, but the impact of uncertainty 
brought by a new partner should not be examined assuming it is isolated from the ties 
among other partners.  
Third, partner uncertainty is not only related to value creation, but also related 




appropriation may undermine a firm’s performance despite the initial purpose of 
partnership (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004; Lavie, 2007). Thus, it has been found that ties are 
more likely to form when there are appropriate defense mechanisms to avoid 
misappropriation (e.g., Gulati & Singh, 1998; Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 
2008), and firm network background has been used as an implicit way to address 
possible misappropriation from new partners (Chung, Harbir, & Lee, 2000; Gulati, 
1995a). However, these studies, due to the focus on dyads, have overlooked group 
network structure as an important defense mechanism. Group network structure, as 
the immediate setting, may influence partner value appropriation through its influence 
on power distribution/power asymmetry in a group. Perceived uncertainty about an 
unfamiliar partner may be different depending on the power distribution in the 
setting. Power asymmetry in a group may exacerbate or attenuate the uncertainty 
brought by a new and unfamiliar partner, depending on whether the power advantage 
is on the side of focal unfamiliar partner or on the side of other group members.  An 
unfamiliar partner that is in an advantaged power position will be far more 
threatening than the one that has less power over other group members. However, 
despite that a network has been viewed as a political economy (Benson, 1975), the 
political nature of networks is underexplored in the network formation literature. 
Even though my first essay has found that power asymmetry in a group will reduce 
group formation, how such power asymmetry influences the participation and 
inclusion of a particular firm remains unknown.  
To further our understanding of partner unfamiliarity/uncertainty and tie 




group perspective. The combination of a firm focus and a group perspective enables 
me to study ties in a group by separating two parts: one is the relationships a firm h s 
with other (potential) group members; the other is the relationships among other 
(potential) group members. By separating the two parts, I am able to study how 
unfamiliarity and uncertainty may influence a firm’s participation in a group.  
The dyad-level research has found that a firm is less likely to tie with an 
unfamiliar partner. Similarly, I expect that a firm is less likely to join the group if it is 
unfamiliar with other (potential) group member. However, such a firm still 
participates in groups involving multiple new partnerships. In this essay, my research 
examines under what situation a firm will participate in a group with mostly 
unfamiliar partners. Different from prior research, which has focused on the 
uncertainty brought by one unfamiliar partner to a certain focal firm, this study 
analyzes the uncertainty brought by an unfamiliar firm to all other group members. 
This is because the likelihood of a new partner participating in a group is not only 
related to its relationship with one of the other group members (even with the one that 
is most important), but also associated to its relationships with all other group 
members.  
By focusing on a firm’s prior relationships with all other (potential) group 
members, I am able to study the dynamics between one firm and all other (potential) 
group members, which has been neglected in the prior network formation literature. I 
argue that value creation has to be examined together with value appropriation. The 
same firm attribute that may reduce the uncertainty in value creation may actually 




power is closely related to value appropriation as well as interest distribution, and the 
conflicting views and interests in the strategic decisions process often need to be 
settled through the exercise of power. Thus, I emphasize the power aspects of group 
dynamics in network formation inside a group. I argue that power distribution inside a 
group will exacerbate or alleviate the uncertainty brought by an unfamiliar firm, thus 
influencing the likelihood of group formation involving the unfamiliar firm. Only the 
power asymmetry that reduces uncertainty about an unfamiliar firm will help its 
group participation. When the uncertainty brought by an unfamiliar partner may be 
increased by power asymmetry, groups involving this unfamiliar firm will not be 
formed.  
In particular, I propose that the value appropriation uncertainty in a group 
brought by an unfamiliar partner depends on: 1) the unfamiliar partner’s prior tie 
strength with the other (potential) group members, and 2) the prior relationships 
among other (potential) group members. Moreover, I explore the role of firm 
experiences as a signal of capability in value creation as well as its role as a signal of 
power extension in value appropriation. I argue that the effects of the two network 
variables will be even stronger for more experienced firms. My arguments ar  tested 
using U.S. VC investment data between 1985 and 2008. 
This essay contributes to both the network formation literature and the research 
on coalition and power. First, this essay examines when a firm is more likely to form 
ties with multiple new partners simultaneously. Studying a firm’s tie formation with 
other group members enables me to explore the dynamics between one firm and other 




uncertainty can be signaled by the firm’s network background. In contrast, I argue
that the perceived partner uncertainty brought by an unfamiliar firm is directly lated 
to the internal network of the setting. Third, this study combines the coalition 
argument and the network theory. It provides another explanation of coalition 
formation in addition to resource distribution and suggests that prior ties between 
firms offers an important base for coalition formation.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
A new partner often brings two types of uncertainty: one is related to the 
partner’s capability in value creation; the other is related to its reliability and ability in 
value appropriation. In this section, I first show that participating in a group is less 
likely when a firm is new to most of other (potential) group members. Next, I eplain 
how firm experience and prior relationships among potential group members may 
influence the uncertainty brought by an unfamiliar firm in value creation and value
appropriation, thus impacting its group participation. Last, I contrast value creation 
and value appropriation by discussing the dual effects of firm experience in both 
aspects.  
Uncertainty and Group Participation 
Since prior relational experiences often provide information about partners’ 
capability and reliability, research found that past partners are often preferred due to 
the reduced uncertainty (e.g., Gulati, 1995a; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Li & Rowley, 
2002). Consistent with the dyad literature, Essay I shows that groups with lower 




on the prior tie history a firm has with other (potential) group members, may also pl y 
an important role in the firm’s group participation. All things being equal, the greater 
number of (potential) group members a firm is new to, the greater amount of 
uncertainty the firm will bring to the group to be formed. When a firm is new to all 
other (potential) group members, other (potential) group members are less likely to 
learn about the unfamiliar firm from each other. This will incur a greate amount of 
uncertainty about the new partner. Thus,  
H1: A firm is less likely to become a member of a group when it has lower tie 
density with other group members.  
Value Creation: Experience as a Signal of Capability 
Besides previous partnerships, a firm’s attractiveness as a partner also 
depends on its attributes. Generally, a firm with more capability and resource will be 
more attractive in partnership formation because the ultimate goal of cooperati n is to 
obtain resources that cannot be obtained otherwise (e.g., Baum, Calabrese, & 
Silverman, 2000). For example, Li and Rowley (2002) found that a firm tended to 
work with past partners that were more experienced. When a partner’s value 
appropriation is controlled, a firm will benefit more from partners with more 
resources (Lavie, 2007).  
When there are no previous partnerships, obtaining information from 
relational experiences is not an option and thus there is higher uncertainty regarding a 
new partner’s capability in value creation. In an uncertain situation like this, firm  
often search for signals for quality (Spence, 1973). For a firm unfamiliar to other 




capability and its controllable resources. An experienced firm is often considered as 
more capable and richer in resource. The signaling effect of experience has b en well 
documented. Research suggested that firms signaling strong capability in uncertain 
situations are more likely to be accepted. For example, Higgins and Gulati (2006) 
found that the legitimizing signal sent out by the experiences of a firm’s top 
management team attracted more and high-quality investors in undertaking an IPO. 
Thus, signals, such as experience, may reduce uncertainty brought by an unfamiliar 
firm in value creation, which in turn increases the attractiveness of the unfamiliar firm 
to other (potential) group members. Therefore,  
H2: The likelihood that a firm joins a group with firms with whom it has lower 
tie density will be higher if the firm is more experienced. 
Value Appropriation: Power and Network Formation 
 However, a new partner not only adds uncertainty in value creation, but may 
also bring uncertainty in value appropriation. The amount of the uncertainty brought 
by a new partner in value appropriation depends on its power position inside a group. 
A partner’s uncertainty in value appropriation may be either exacerbated or alleviated 
by its power position relative to other group members.  
Power is defined as the potential or capacity to influence other firm’s 
behaviors (Tushman, 1977). A firm’s power position corresponds to its capacity of 
value appropriation. Since power per se is relational (Chassagnon, 2009), prior 
research has established close links between power and networks. On the one hand, 
powerful parties may benefit more from exchange or cooperation networks. In 




more favorable exchange conditions (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005). Even in horizontal 
cooperation networks, firms often have conflicting interests along with the 
cooperation. Power, as the key factor in the strategic decision-making (Eisenhardt & 
Bourgeois, 1988; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974), is often the way to solve such conflicting 
views. Thus, more powerful firms are able to appropriate more value from the 
partnerships and alliances (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004; Khanna et al., 1998; Lavie, 2007; 
Levy, 2008).  
On the other hand, firm power can be derived from network connections. A 
firm’s power is directly related to its dependency on the environment or other firms 
(Emerson, 1962). Although the power and dependency in a dyad relationship are 
often determined by their resources, a firm can gain leverage by forming ties with a 
third party that may have certain control over the other party (Gargiulo, 1993). Thus, 
firm power can be derived from “network structures or patterns of direct linkage 
between agencies in a specific network” (Benson, 1975).  
Because power enables firms to appropriate more values from cooperation and 
can be derived from network structures, I argue that firms are concerned about the 
future power distribution at the stage of group network formation. Based on Essay I, 
which shows that coalition concerns and power imbalance may reduce the likelihood 
of group formation, I further argue that the likelihood that a firm may participate in a 
group with unfamiliar partners depends on its expected power position in the group to 
be formed.  
In a group involving more than two actors, coalition is an important way to 




Coalition members cooperate to promote their own interest even though that may 
sacrifice the interest of other group members (Polzer et al., 1998). Hence, a firm in a 
weak position is likely to gain a powerful position by forming a coalition with other 
firms (Emerson, 1962).  
While game theorists focus on coalition payoff, sociologists and psychologies 
have considered resource distribution as the main driver for coalition membership 
(Caplow, 1956; Cook & Gilmore, 1984; Gamson, 1961; Komorita & Chertkoff, 
1973). However, because actors only have bounded rationality (Simon, 1955) and 
may not be a “utility maximizer” with full information (Cook & Gilmore, 1984), 
coalition in reality may not form purely based on resources and calculated payoff.
Interactive histories among actors as well their future interactions (Cook & Gilmore, 
1984) may play an important role in coalition formation. Furthermore, compatible 
interests as well as trust are found to be necessary in forming a coalition and 
coalitions are stable to some extent (Bazerman et al., 2000; Polzer et al., 1998).  Thus, 
I argue that whether a firm is part of a coalitional subset of a group depends on its 
prior ties with other group members as well as the prior ties among other group 
members.  
It has been suggested that trust often emerges from repeated ties (Gulati,
1995b), that stronger ties are often associated with low-level conflicts (Krackhardt & 
Stern, 1988; Nelson, 1989), and that frequent interactions may increase the formation 
likelihood of a coalition (Stevenson, Pearce, & Porter, 1985). Therefore, stronger ties 
between subgroup members are often likely to foster formation of coalitions. Since 




2001), a group member new to most of the other group members is even more likely 
to form a coalition with the group member it was strongly tied to.  
Without many prior interactions to prove its reliability, a firm new to most of 
other (potential) group members may bring a higher level of uncertainty into the 
group. In such a situation, a coalition involving the unfamiliar firm may dramatically 
increase the power of the unfamiliar firm in the group, adding a greater amount of 
uncertainty in value appropriation. Once a group is formed, an unfamiliar group 
member in a possible coalition will be more threatening to other group members it is 
unfamiliar to. Therefore, I argue that a firm’s group participation with mostly 
unfamiliar (potential) group members will be influenced by the anticipated power 
distribution in the coming group. A firm strongly tied with one (potential) group 
member but unfamiliar to most of other (potential) group members will not be 
favored due to the higher uncertainty it brings in value appropriation. Thus, I expect 
H3a: The likelihood that a firm joins a group with firms with whom it has 
lower tie density will be even lower when its maximum tie strength with other 
potential group members is greater. 
On the other hand, an unfamiliar group member’s relative power in a group 
also depends on the prior ties among other group members. The same logic between 
strong ties and coalition formation will also work on the side of other group members. 
The greater tie strength among other group members, the more likely that they have 
compatible interests and trust among each other. In a situation where there are 
conflicting interests from an unfamiliar group member, other group members may 




coalitional subgroup. The coalition can be used to protect the interests of other group 
members from being appropriated and alleviate the value-appropriation uncertai ty 
from the unfamiliar firm. Hence, I expect that other (potential) group members take 
the expected power distribution into consideration in the group participation process 
of an unfamiliar firm. The reduced uncertainty from an unfamiliar firm due to its 
disadvantaged power position in the coming group will increase the likelihood that 
the unfamiliar firm is included in the same group. Thus,  
H3b: The likelihood that a firm joins a group with firms with whom it has 
lower tie density will be higher when the other potential group members have 
stronger ties among themselves. 
Value Creation versus Value Appropriation: Experience as a Signal of Power 
As argued above, unfamiliarity not only brings uncertainty regarding a new 
partner’s capability, but also adds uncertainty regarding its reliability. While 
capability refers to a firm’s ability in value creation, reliability is related to its ability 
in value appropriation. However, a firm attribute that enables a firm to contribute 
more to a group may also facilitate the firm to appropriate greater value. Firm 
experience is such an attribute. Although experience may signal a firm’s capability 
and thus reduce the uncertainty in value creation, it may also pose greater partn r 
uncertainty in value appropriation, in some cases. Experienced firms may be able to
appropriate higher value with the price of other firms’ interests. Thus, for a firm to be 
participating in a group with other potential group members with whom it has lower 
tie density, experience may deliver different information. The conflicting information 




One occasion that may exacerbate the likelihood of value appropriation by an 
unfamiliar but more experienced firm is when the firm has a strong tie with another 
group member. Unfamiliar with most of other group members, a firm is more likely 
to form a subgroup coalition with its past partner based on the strong tie. Such a 
coalition will increase the power of the unfamiliar firm and help it promote its own 
interest. When an experienced firm has a strong tie with one (potential) group 
member but is unfamiliar to most of other (potential) group members, its experience 
sends out a stronger signal of power in value appropriation compared to the signal of 
capability in value creation.  Thus, 
H4a: Firm experience will strengthen the positive interaction effect of firm-
specific tie density and maximum tie strength on firm participation in H3a i.e., the 
likelihood that a firm joins a group with firms with whom it has lower tie density will 
be even lower if the firm has greater experience as well as stronger ties with other 
potential group members. 
However, the negative effect of experiences as a signal of power may be 
alleviated if other (potential) group members are tightly connected with strong ties. 
Even when the unfamiliar firm is the most powerful actor in the group, the “all weak
again strong” coalition among other group members may also be able to achieve a 
power balance (Cook & Gilmore, 1984). Therefore,  
H4b: Firm experience will strengthen the negative interaction effect of firm-
specific tie density and alter tie strength on firm participation in H4a i.e., the 




be higher if the firm has greater experience and other potential group members are 
strongly tied to each other. 
Methodology 
Data 
I study the likelihood that a firm participates in a group using venture capital 
investment data between 1985 and 2008. As in Essay I, VC syndication is the 
application of group formation in the VC context. VC syndication formation is an 
appropriate setting to test my hypotheses in this essay because: 1) VC investme t 
involves high uncertainty and one important purpose of syndication is to reduce risks 
involved in deals (Manigart et al., 2006). Given that, syndicate members are 
especially concerned about the uncertainty brought by unfamiliar syndicate members; 
2) VC firms make final commitment simultaneously with the knowledge of who else 
is on board, despite that they may show their interests in investment at different 
points of time. Thus, for any firm to be involved in a deal, each potential group 
member needs to agree. This will enable me to study how the prior relationships of a 
firm with all other potential group members will influence its chance of getting 
involved.  
The primary data source I used is the Venture Expert database. As in Essay I, I 
included first-round syndicates by U.S. VC firms (excluding angles) for U.S.-based 
startup companies that are in “Seed Stage”, “Early Stage”, or “Expansion Stage” and 
that are less than ten years old. However, since I focus on in-group networks to refer 




were included in this study. There are totally 1397 first-round syndicates included in 
the sample.   
As in Essay I, I prepared a VC pool for each startup company by including all 
U.S. VC firms that invested in the same industry, same state, same year, and the same 
quarter of the focal startup company. Nevertheless, the focus of this essay, a firm’s 
group participation, makes it different from Essay I in generating hypot etical 
samples. In this essay, to generate the matched hypothetical groups, I replaced one 
VC firm in a real syndicate case (except for the lead VC) at a time. For example, if 
the real syndicate includes firms A, B, C, and D and firm A is the lead VC, I first hold 
firms A, C, and D constant and replace firm B by randomly selecting one potential 
VC investor from the VC pool for the startup company to generate a hypothetical 
case. Firm C is then replaced using a similar approach and then firm D is the next. 
Since I am interested in when a firm may participate in a group with parners with 
whom it has a lower density, I group on the startup company and the other potential 
group members in my analysis to control for the effect caused by the other group 
members for this specific startup company.  
Although I study group participation of a firm in this essay and generated 
hypothetical groups by replacing one firm at a time, the empirical design in this study 
is consistent with the group perspective I proposed in Essay I. To examine when firm 
D participates in a group consisting of firms A, B, and C, with whom firm D has 
lower tie density, I assume that 1) firms A, B, and C are willing to work with each 
other, and 2) firms A, B, and C will make a commitment of group participation as 




assumptions are consistent with the main essence of the group perspective, which 
emphasizes that any group member unacceptable to others may make the formation of 
a group involving all of them fall apart. Keeping other group members constant and 
only concentrating on one group member at a time will help avoid the possible 
confounding effects from the other group members. If the other group members wer  
also replaced in hypothetical cases, it would have been difficult to distinguish 
whether the group fails to form because of the focal firm or because of the other firms 
that have been replaced simultaneously. Meanwhile, this study and empirical design 
are different from dyadic level studies in that the likelihood of a firm participating in 
a group depends on all other potential group members, rather than just one of them. 
Therefore, this firm-focused group perspective is appropriate to study the research 
question in this essay.  
Based on the methods I discussed above, I generated one hypothetical case for 
each VC firm involved in a real syndicate. Thus, each VC firm in the real syndicate 
(except for the lead VC) could be the focal VC that may be replaced in hypothetical 
cases, and the total number of hypothetical cases for a startup company is determined 
by the syndicate size (excluding the lead VC if there is one). By keeping other firms 
constant and replacing one firm at a time, the choice-based sampling approach used in 
this essay enables me to study when a particular firm may participate in a group 
together with other group members with whom it has lower tie density. I tested my 
hypotheses using the conditional logit model. As argued in Essay I, the conditional 




independent variables lacking within-case variation will not be estimated in the 
conditional logit model.  
Measures 
Dependent variable: 
Firm participation is a dummy variable, indicating whether a focal VC firm 
participates in the syndicate. A focal VC firm refers to the real VC syndicate member 
to be replaced in the real case or the hypothetical VC firm that replaced a real VC 
syndicate member. Firm participation is equal to one if the focal VC firm was a real 
syndicate member for the specific deal and equal to zero when the focal VC firm did 
not participate in the deal but could have joined.  
Independent variables: 
Firm-specific tie density measures the ratio of existing ties between a focal 
VC and other VCs in a syndicate divided by total possible ties between the focal VC 
and the other VCs. It is a continuous variable between 0 and 1. When the focal VC 
firm has worked with all other syndicate members prior to the current deal, this 
variable equals to 1. On the other extreme, it is equal to 0 if the focal VC firm has no 
prior ties with any of the other syndicate members.  
Experience of focal VC was calculated by counting the total number of startup 
companies a focal VC firm has invested in prior years before the current deal. To 
correct for the skewness of this variable, I did a log transformation.  
Focal firm maximum tie strength. I first measured the tie strength between a 
focal VC firm and each of the other syndicate members. Then, I calculated the 




the focal VC is likely to form a coalition with the other syndicate members it 
partnered with before. A stronger tie indicates a higher possibility of coalition 
formation involving the focal VC. A potential coalition may increase the power of the 
focal VC firm, thus increasing the uncertainty in value appropriation brought by the 
focal VC firm. Since this variable is skewed, a log transformation was used.  
Average tie strength among other members. It i  measured as the average of 
tie strength among all the other syndicate members excluding the focal VC firm. I 
calculated this variable as the proxy for coalition formation among the other group 
members except for the focal VC firm. Again, higher average tie strength represents a 
higher chance of a coalition formation among the other group members. A coalition 
formation among other group members will reduce the power of the focal VC firm, 
thus decreasing the uncertainty in value appropriation brought by the focal VC firm.  
Control variables:  
VC type heterogeneity. Since the sample includes not only independent VC 
firms, but also other types of VC firms, such as corporate VC, investment banks, etc., 
I used the VC type heterogeneity to control for the tendency that VC firms in similar 
type are more likely to join together. It is an entropy measure calculated as ∑pi*ln(1/ 
pi), where pi is the percentage of a specific VC type in the syndicate group. 
Focal VC distance to other members: VC firms tend to work with other VC 
firms that are geographically closer (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Therefore, I 
calculated the average geographic distance between a focal VC firm and other 
syndicate members in a syndicate to control for this effect. From the zip codes of VC 




calculated the distance between the focal VC firm and every other syndicate member 
using spherical geometry and took an average of them. A log transformation is used 
to correct for the skewness.  
Focal VC distance to the company. Since VC firms tend to invest in local 
start-up companies, I also calculated the geographic distance between the focal VC 
firm and the startup company using spherical geometry. Then, a log transformation 
was used to correct for the skewness.  
Average experience of other members. To test the effect of focal firm 
experience, I controlled for the experience level of the other group members. It wa  
calculated as the average of the experiences of the other group members except for 
the focal VC firm. The experience was measured as the total number of startup 
companies a VC firm has invested until the prior year.  
Focal firm inside indirect tie density. I first calculated the number of indirect 
ties between the focal VC firm and the other syndicate members through VC firms 
inside of the focal syndicate. Then, I divided this number by the total possible indirect 
ties between the focal VC firm and the other syndicate members to measure focal 
firm inside indirect tie density.   
Focal firm outside indirect tie density. Similarly, I first calculated the number 
of indirect ties between a focal VC firm and other syndicate members through VC 
firms outside of the focal syndicate, and then divided it by the total possible indirect 





 The descriptive statistics shown in Table 2.1 indicates that 3%-4% of the 
observations have missing values on the two distance variables. When using 
conditional logit models, simply dropping the missing observations in analysis may 
lose within-case variation on some variables and thus lead to a greater loss of usable 
observations. To control for the effect of missing values, I generated dummy 
variables to indicate the missing observations.  
 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Firm participation 9202 0.5000 0.5000 0 1.0000 
Firm-specific tie density 9202 0.2821 0.3465 0 1.0000 
Focal firm experience (ln) 9202 3.0485 1.6375 0 6.7081 
Focal firm maximum tie strength (ln) 9202 0.8277 1.0879 0 4.6913 
Avg tie strength among other members 9202 2.8076 7.098  0 86.0000 
VC type heterogeneity 9202 0.4555 0.4007 0 1.6094 
Focal firm distance to other members (ln) 8947 6.181 1.8641 0 7.9015 
Focal firm distance to company (ln) 8870 5.1240 2.3306 0 7.9091 
Avg exp among other members 9202 63.4076 63.8434 0 533.0000 
Focal firm inside indirect tie density 9202 0.0765 0.1720 0 0.8571 
Focal firm outside indirect tie density 9202 0.4084 0.3600 0 1.0000 
The within-group correlation matrix is given in Table 2.2. It shows that both 
focal-specific tie density and focal firm maximum tie strength are positively 
correlated with the dependent variables, firm participation, while focal firm outside 
indirect tie density is negatively correlated with firm participation. Also, not 
surprisingly, focal-specific tie density, focal firm experience, and focal firm 
maximum tie strength all positively associate with each other.  
In this essay, I study how firm-specific tie density may influence its likelihood 
of participating in a group and when a firm may still join in a group mostly consisting 




logit models and the results are shown in Table 2.3. Model 1 includes all control 
variables. As expected, VC type heterogeneity, focal VC firm distance from other 
group members or the startup company, and focal VC outside indirect tie density all 
significantly reduce the likelihood of a focal firm participating in the group. 
Meanwhile, inside indirect tie increase the chance that a focal firm joins in the group. 
Even though this essay emphasizes a firm focus together with a group perspective, all 




Table 2.2: Correlation Table 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Firm participation 1         
2 Firm-specific tie density 0.3176 1        
3 Focal firm experience (ln) -0.026 0.513 1       
4 Focal firm maximum tie strength (ln) 0.3061 0.7918 0.584 1      
5 VC type heterogeneity -0.0719 -0.0928 -0.1003 -0.1267 1     
6 Focal firm distance to other members (ln) -0.1746 -0.133 0.0207 -0.1223 0.076 1    
7 Focal firm distance to company (ln) -0.1296 -0.0675 0.0546 -0.0688 0.095 0.4887 1   
8 Firm-spec tie density*avg exp of other members 0.0237 0.2297 0.1572 0.2402 -0.0322 -0.0217 0.0248 1  
9 Focal firm inside indirect tie density -0.0041 0.0409 0.1363 0.1503 -0.0189 -0.0118 0.0151 -0.0359 1 
10 Focal firm outside indirect tie density -0.2862 -0.5737 0.1392 -0.4031 0.0235 0.1065 0.0762 -0.1451 0.1307 
11 Focal firm exp*firm-spec tie density 0.1713 0.3007 -0.1418 0.298 0.0115 -0.0497 -0.0451 0.1128 -0.2724 
12 Firm-spec tie density*firm maxi tie strength 0.221 0.5259 0.3198 0.6299 -0.099 -0.0989 -0.0531 0.3486 -0.373 
13 Firm-spec tie density*avg tie strength of others 0.0295 0.1955 0.0872 0.1705 -0.0512 -0.0637 -0.0245 0.5098 -0.0626 
14 Focal firm exp*firm max tie strength 0.2013 0.3349 0.114 0.6084 -0.0356 -0.0704 -0.0503 0.1769 -0.1455 
15 Focal firm exp*firm-spec tie density*firm max tie strength 0.1534 0.5776 0.6141 0.6997 -0.0883 -0.0535 -0.0073 0.3131 -0.1381 
16 Focal firm exp*avg tie strength of others 0.0472 0.1177 -0.0337 0.1389 -0.0273 -0.0786 -0.0295 0.3384 0.0198 
17 Focal firm exp*firm-spec tie density*avg tie strength of others -0.0303 0.0659 0.1722 0.1311 -0.0112 -0.0285 -0.0091 0.109 -0.1388 
 
  10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
10 Focal firm outside indirect tie density 1        
11 Focal firm exp*firm-spec tie density -0.5916 1       
12 Firm-spec tie density*firm maxi tie strength -0.3919 0.5503 1      
13 Firm-spec tie density*avg tie strength of others -0.1275 0.0558 0.2712 1     
14 Focal firm exp*firm max tie strength -0.4526 0.7719 0.6583 0.0824 1    
15 Focal firm exp*firm-spec tie density*firm max tie strength -0.2348 0.4293 0.8472 0.186 0.6368 1   
16 Focal firm exp*avg tie strength of others -0.1204 0.1966 0.2206 0.6853 0.1761 0.1717 1  




Table 2.3: Conditional Logit Regressions on Matched Sample 
 
 model_1 model_2 model_3 model_4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
     
VC type heterogeneity -0.3800 -0.2743 -0.3547 -0.2118 
 0.1021*** 0.1043** 0.1066*** 0.1049*   
Focal firm distance to other members (ln) -0.1249 -0.1154 -0.1049 -0.1147 
 0.0177*** 0.0180*** 0.0183*** 0.0181*** 
Focal firm distance to other members missing 0.3213 0.4113 0.3165 0.4408 
 0.4142 0.4230 0.4347 0.4274 
Focal firm distance to company (ln) -0.0332 -0.0353 -0.0286 -0.0340 
 0.0113** 0.0115** 0.0117* 0.0116**  
Focal firm distance to company missing -1.2835 -1.2769 -1.1795 -1.2733 
 0.4061** 0.4151** 0.4267** 0.4196**  
Firm-spec tie density*avg exp of other members -0.0012 -0.0043 -0.0039 -0.0056 
 0.0010 0.0011*** 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 
Focal firm inside indirect tie density 0.3203 0.004 0.0569 0.0244 
 0.1485* 0.1560 0.1646 0.1999 
Focal firm outside indirect tie density -1.3068 -0.7460 0.0616 -0.7731 
 0.0732*** 0.0843*** 0.1169 0.0852*** 
Firm-specific tie density  1.2691 2.5475 0.5532 
  0.0988*** 0.1502*** 0.1427*** 
Focal firm experience (ln)   -0.2699  
   0.0227***  
Firm-specific tie density*Focal firm experience   0.0142  
   0.0640  
Focal firm maximum tie strength (ln)    0.2422 
    0.0504*** 
Firm-specific tie density*Firm max tie strength    0.2324 
    0.1112*   
chi2 df_m 525.2259 701.5290 852.9653 759.0452 
N 9202 9202 9202 9202 
p 2.70E-108 3.20E-145 8.00E-176 1.20E-155 
ll -2926.5570 -2838.4060 -2762.6880 -2809.6480 
r2_p 0.0823 0.1100 0.1337 0.1190 
 
 Hypothesis 1 proposes that a firm is less likely to join a group with firms with 
whom it has lower tie density. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Model 2 shows the 
positive effects of focal firm-specific tie density on the focal VC’s likelihood to join 
the syndicate. Based on the finding in Model 2, I further explore how the likelihood 
of a firm participating in a group with unfamiliar partners may depend on the 




From the perspective of value creation, I examine the role of experience as a 
signal of capability and expect that firm experience will increase the chance that a 
firm joins a group with unfamiliar partners (Hypothesis 2). However, although Model 
3 shows a positive interaction between focal firm experience and firm-specific tie 
density, the effect is not significant. In contrast, this interaction term becomes 
significant in Models 6 and 8 in Table 2.4, when the three-way interaction of focal 
firm experience, firm-specific tie density, and focal firm maximum tie s rength is 
included. The three-way interaction is used to capture the role of experience as a 
signal of power. It suggests that firm experience may reduce a firm’s chance of 
participating in the group if the firm is perceived as having more power due to the 
greater experience. The contrasting results in Models 3, 6, and 8 confirm that 
experience has dual roles in an uncertainty situation. A firm’s experience is not only a 
signal of capability, but may also become a signal of power in value appropriation. 
The conflicting information coming from experience may create a tension between 
value creation and value appropriation. As suggested by Models 3, 6, and 8, only 
when experience’s negative effect in value appropriation is controlled can its positive 




Table 2.4: Conditional Logit Regressions on Matched Sample (Cont.) 
 
 model_5 model_6 model_7 model_8 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
     
VC type heterogeneity -0.2762 -0.2500 -0.3561 -0.2481 
 0.1043** 0.1089* 0.1066*** 0.1090*   
Focal firm distance to other members (ln) -0.1158 -0.0980 -0.1053 -0.0989 
 0.0180*** 0.0188*** 0.0183*** 0.0188*** 
Focal firm distance to other members missing 0.4091 0.3679 0.3146 0.3703 
 0.4229 0.4482 0.4347 0.4501 
Focal firm distance to company (ln) -0.0354 -0.0229 -0.0290 -0.0235 
 0.0115** 0.0119+ 0.0117* 0.0120*   
Focal firm distance to company missing -1.2752 -1.1686 -1.1803 -1.1794 
 0.4150** 0.4401** 0.4267** 0.4420**  
Firm-spec tie density*avg exp of other members -0.0036 -0.0066 -0.0030 -0.0058 
 0.0843*** 0.1205 0.1177 0.1214 
Focal firm inside indirect tie density -0.0044 -0.1920 0.0046 -0.2433 
 0.0013** 0.0012*** 0.0013* 0.0014*** 
Focal firm outside indirect tie density -0.7458 0.0639 0.0531 0.0503 
 0.1561 0.2181 0.1692 0.2217 
Firm-specific tie density 1.2749 1.5241 2.5495 1.4565 
 0.0990*** 0.2129*** 0.1518*** 0.2168*** 
Focal firm experience (ln)  -0.4248 -0.2661 -0.4237 
  0.0322*** 0.0235*** 0.0326*** 
Focal firm exp*firm-spec tie density  -0.2905 0.0047 -0.2733 
  0.1137* 0.0672 0.1162*   
Focal firm maximum tie strength (ln)  0.5869  0.602 
  0.0827***  0.0836*** 
Firm-spec tie density*firm maxi tie strength  0.4231  0.4362 
  0.2005*  0.2040*   
Firm-spec tie density*avg tie strength of others -0.01 0  -0.0188 -0.0116 
 0.0095  0.0129 0.0144 
Focal firm exp*firm max tie strength  -0.0503  -0.0630 
  0.0417  0.0423 
Focal firm exp*firm-spec tie density  0.0623  0.0891 
*firm max tie strenght  0.0843  0.0876 
Focal firm exp*avg tie strength of others   0.0021 -0.0004 
   0.0030 0.0032 
Focal firm exp*firm-spec tie density   -0.0050 -0.0152 
*avg tie strength of others   0.0063 0.0070*   
chi2 df_m 702.6199 1040.0590 856.3146 1048.6560 
N 9202.0000 9202.0000 9202.0000 9202.0000 
p 1.70E-144 3.50E-212 9.80E-174 2.80E-211 
ll -2837.8600 -2669.1410 -2761.0130 -2664.8420 





  From the perspective of value appropriation, Hypotheses 3a and 3b address 
how group settings influence a firm’s likelihood to participate. Hypothesis 3a 
proposes that a firm is even less likely to participate in a group where it has a strong 
tie with one group member but is new to most of other group members. Results in 
Model 4 show that on average, a stronger tie with one group member will increase a 
firm’s likelihood to join the group. This finding confirms the strong tie argument in 
network theory. However, Model 4 also suggests that a strong tie may become an 
obstacle in group participation. If a firm has a previous strong tie with one group 
member but is new to most of others in the same group, the perceived uncertainty 
brought by the firm to the other new partners in the group will be increased. This 
perception happens because the firm’s power may increase when it forms a coalition 
with its trustful past partner. As expected, the interaction between focal firm-specific 
tie density and focal firm maximum tie strength shows support to Hypothesis 3a.  
 On the other hand, Hypothesis 3b presents that a firm is more likely to 
participate in a group with firms with whom it has lower tie density, if other firms 
were strongly connected to each other in prior years. Model 5 in Table 2.4 shows a 
negative interaction between focal firm-specific tie density and average tie strength 
among other group members. This negative sign suggests that when focal firm-
specific tie density is lower, greater average tie strength among other group members 
may increase a firm’s group participation. However, the effect is not significant. This 
may be because the uncertainty brought by the focal VC not only depends on the 
prior ties among group members, but also depends on its own attributes at the same 




threat or add greater uncertainty to the other group members despite its lackof 
relational experiences with other group members. In such a case, it is not necessary 
that other members are tightly tied based on prior ties.  
 Hypotheses 4a and 4b discuss how experience plays a role as a signal of 
power in value appropriation. Model 6 includes the variables testing hypothesis 4a, 
which displays a stronger interaction effect between focal firm-specific tie density 
and focal firm maximum tie strength for more experienced focal firms. Although the 
positive three-way interaction is consistent with my expectation, the effect is not 
significant. This suggests that as long as a firm has strong ties with one group 
member, it may bring more uncertainty to other group members with whom it is 
unfamiliar, regardless of the firm’s prior experience, and such uncertainty will reduce 
the firm’s likelihood to join the group, no matter whether the firm is experienced or 
not.   
 Hypothesis 4b suggests that an experienced (less experienced) firm is more 
likely to join a group with unfamiliar firms who are (are not) tightly tied among 
themselves. This hypothesis was examined using a three-way interaction between 
focal firm-specific tie density, firm experience, and average tie streng h among other 
group members. Although the effect is not significant in Model 7, it is significant in 
the full model, showing support for Hypothesis 4b. This result helps explain why 
Hypothesis 3b is not supported. It suggests that the due to the value appropriation 
concerns, tie strength among the other group members is positively related to a firm’s
participation in a group with more new partners if it is more experienced. 




experienced firm’s likelihood to participate in the group with more new partners, 
because strong ties among other group members makes value appropriation of a new 
partner a less concern but value creation a bigger problem.  
Discussion and Conclusion 
This essay examines the factors that influence the likelihood of a firm 
participating in a group with partners with whom it has lower tie density. It discusses 
and juxtaposes the two important aspects in partnership network: value creation and 
value appropriation. From the perspective of value creation, I show that experience as 
a signal of capability can help reduce the uncertainty about a new partner in value 
creation. From the perspective of value appropriation, I find that a firm’s prior strong 
tie with one group member may prevent it from participating in the same group with 
other unfamiliar firms, regardless of the firm’s experience. I also find that the 
likelihood of an experienced firm participating in a group with unfamiliar partners is 
positively related to the tie strength among other group members. In the process of a 
firm forming a group with mostly new partners, a firm’s experience may both 
decrease the uncertainty in value creation and increase the uncertainty in value 
appropriation.  
This essay has several important contributions to the network literature. First, 
it extends the research on new tie formation from a dyadic level to a firm-focused 
group level. While the prior research focuses on when a focal firm forms ties with one 
new partner, this essay studies tie formations of a firm with all other potential group 
members and investigates when a firm participates in a group together with partners 




perspective enables me to explore the impact of in-group network relationships on 
power distribution and then on value appropriation. By focusing on one firm at a 
time, I am able to dig into the dynamics between one firm and other potential group 
members. Also, studying multiple ties simultaneously enables me to discover how 
potential members in a group setting may constrain each other in a group formation. 
Extending on Sorenson and Stuart (2008)’s research about setting impact on tie 
formation, this essay shows the dynamics between setting attributes and tie formation. 
Rather than viewing group setting as a preset before group formation, I emphasize 
that potential group members may take active roles in determining the setting 
attribute and controlling for uncertainty.  
Second, this essay unveils some interesting aspects of tie strength and firm 
experience in new tie formation. The analysis shows that while strong prior ties may 
provide endorsement to promote tie formation between partners, the likelihood of 
group participation is lower when the preexisting tie between a focal firm and another 
potential group member is stronger, given that the focal firm is new to most of other 
potential group members. This suggests that a firm’s previous strong ties are not 
always helpful in future tie formation. Meanwhile, although experience may reduce 
the uncertainty about a new partner in value creation by signaling the partner’s 
capability, it may also generate concerns about power distribution and power 
dominance in value appropriation. Through studying the prior relationships among 





Third, this essay links the network formation literature with the research on 
coalition, power, and value appropriation. By studying a firm’s group participation 
involving multiple parties, I argue that: 1) prior network relationships among the 
other potential group members may influence an unfamiliar partner’s power through 
possible coalition formation involving or excluding the unfamiliar partner, thus 
impacting its perceived uncertainty in value appropriation; and 2) the perceiv d 
uncertainty in value appropriation may influence the participation likelihood of the 
unfamiliar partner. That is, potential coalition may either facilitate or hinder firm 
participation depending on whether coalition formation is expected to reduce or 
increase uncertainty in value appropriation. Since concerns about a firm’s uncertainty 
in value appropriation may prevent the firm from participating in the group, both 
value creation and value appropriation are important factors in affecting partnership 
formation. This essay echoes the prior studies in that partners with most resources 
may not be best choice for partnerships, since the powerful partner with the most 
resources may appropriate more value from alliances (Bae & Gargiulo, 2004; Lavie, 
2007).  
This essay also casts light to the research on exploration and exploitation. 
Prior literature has treated a firm’s tie formation with past partners as exploitation and 
tie formation with new partners as exploration (e.g., Beckman et al., 2004; Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). However, the way to achieve exploration has not been well 
understood in current literature. Firms may explore multiple new relationships at one 
time or gradually develop new relationships. Prior literature on new tie exploration 




overlooking the process of exploration in different contexts. This essay fills in the gap 
and uncovers the conditions under which a firm is tied to multiple new partners 
simultaneously.  
The essay has practical implications to practitioners. By distinguishing t e 
uncertainty in value creation and the uncertainty in value appropriation, it shows t e 
situations in which the uncertainty in value appropriation may overshadow the 
uncertainty in value creation when there is a tension between the two. When forming 
multi-firm alliances or syndicates, potential participants may judge the potential 
uncertainty from unfamiliar partners using internal network structures in the setting. 
In group participation with many new partners, a preexisting strong tie with a 
potential group member may not be as helpful as expected.  
This essay also has some limitations deserving future efforts. Since I study in-
group networks and focus only on groups with three or more firms, I take the 
perspective of majority group members and study when a firm may participate 
together. By taking the perspective of majority group members, I emphasize the 
constraints that may be posed by other group members. I assumed that in most cases, 
despite the unfamiliarity, a firm is motivated to participate in a syndicate because of 
the opportunity to invest in a startup company. Although I agree that firm motivatin 
is also important in group participation, a firm’s group participation is still up to the 
approval of every other group member. If other group members have concerns about 
a particular firm, the firm will not be able to participate in the same group regardless 
of its motivation. Indeed, if the motivational side were a factor of greater importance, 




partners is higher when its preexisting tie is stronger. But the empirical results suggest 
the opposite.   
Research in the future may add inputs of richer contextual evidences. 
Qualitative examples or stories will better illustrate value appropriation in a specific 
context. Moreover, future research may use the methodology developed in this essay 
to study the evolution of groups. For example, future research may examine wheth r 
the internal network of a first round VC syndicate influences the change of group size 
or group composition. It may further examine what kinds of VC firms are mor likely 
to be added in a subsequent round. The study of syndicate evolution involves greater 
complexity though. For example, it is likely that more than one additional firm join in 
the subsequent round. For subsequent syndicates with multiple newly added VC 
firms, researchers may also take into consideration the prior relationships among the 







Essay III: Impact of Syndicate Network Structures on Startup 
Company Performance 
Introduction 
In the first two essays, I have found that Venture Capital (VC) firms tend to 
form syndicates with familiar partners. However, whether such syndicate behaviors 
actually influence syndicate performance remains unknown. Thus, in the third essay, I 
examine the potential impacts of syndicate network attributes on startup company 
performance.  
Due to the high uncertainty in VC investment, VC firms often syndicate to 
back up start-up companies. VC syndication can help select startup companies with 
better quality (selection hypothesis); offer financial and nonfinancial resou ces and 
add value to startup companies through monitoring and nurturing (value addition 
hypothesis); help share risks in VC investment (risk sharing hypothesis); and also 
boost VC reputation by investing in successful startup companies (window-dressing 
hypothesis) (Brander et al., 2002). While risk sharing and window-dressing are 
important to the performance of VC firms, selection hypothesis and value addition 
hypothesis suggest a positive relationship between VC syndication and the star up
company performance. 
Empirical studies have already confirmed the positive impact of the use of 
syndication. For example, Baker (2000) found that syndication at the second round 




syndication declined as the VC firm ages. Brander, Amit, and Antweiler (2002) 
indicated that rate of return to VC syndication was higher than that of singleVC 
investment.  Even controlling for the endogeneity issue of VC syndication, Tian 
(2008) discovered that companies backed by VC syndicates performed better than 
those backed by single VC firms.  
Although these studies have pointed out the importance of VC syndication, 
how attributes of VC syndicates may influence startup company performance is still 
underexplored. Some studies have shown that syndicate size (Brander et al., 2002; De 
Clercq & Dimov, 2008; Tian, 2008) and syndicate homogeneity in performance (Du, 
2009) are positively related to a startup company’s performance. But, many other 
important attributes of VC syndicates are left unexamined. One of these important 
attributes is syndicates’ network structure. When VC firms form a syndicate, their 
prior relationships among each other constitute an internal local network structure at 
the group level and the syndicate itself locates in an overall VC network based on its 
members’ connections with other VC firms outside of the focal syndicate. Since prior 
research has shown that firm network structure is critical to firm performance, it is 
important to study how the network structures of VC syndicates may influence the 
performance of startup companies.  
In this essay, I investigate the impact of both internal network density within a 
syndicate and external structural holes of a syndicate in the overall VC network. 
Based on the traditional social capital theory of network closure, I argue that 
syndicate internal density will have a positive impact on a startup company’s 




influence from a VC syndicate’s network structural hole position. Moreover, I 
propose that the effects of syndicate internal density and external structural hole will 
vary depending on the company’s age and other syndicate attributes, such as 
syndicate size and heterogeneity. To test these hypotheses, I used the data of U.S. VC 
investments from 1998 to 2003. The empirical results suggest that there are 
significant impacts of both syndicate internal density and external structural holes, 
even when endogeneity and selection bias are taken into consideration. 
This study has important contributions to entrepreneurship literature. It 
extends the literature on VC syndication and startup companies by combining the 
network structure theory with the VC syndication phenomena.9 Although some prior 
research has found that a lead VC firm’s network position has an positive 
contribution to a startup company’s performance (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, & Lu, 
2007), current research has shown that other non-lead VC firms in a syndicate also 
play an important role in the startup company’s performance (e.g., Brander et al., 
2002; Tian, 2008). As such, it is interesting and necessary to examine the impact of 
the syndicate network structure both inside a syndicate and outside a syndicate (rather 
than outside a particular VC firm).  
Second, prior literature (at the dyad level) and my first two essays (at the 
group level) have suggested that firms prefer to form ties with their prior partners. 
However, whether such network tie formation behaviors have positive economic 
                                                
9
 Although De Clercq and Dimov (De Clercq & Dimov, 2008) studied the impact of internal 
relationships in a syndicate on startup company performance, there are two major issues in their study. 
First, there is a mixing level of studies. Their study focuses on individual VC level and examines how 
a focal VC’s (not necessarily lead VC) total number of prior interactions with other VC syndicate 
members influence the startup company performance. Second, their study did not control for 
endogeneity; the positive relationships between internal network and startup company performance 




implication is still unknown. The prior research on group density is at the team level, 
where team members are mostly assigned instead of self-selected (Reagans, 
Zuckerman, & Mcevily, 2004; Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001). To my knowledge, 
there is no study distinguishing network self-selecting behaviors and network 
influences at the inter-firm group level. However, such distinction is quite important, 
since it enables us to study the direct impact of such network formation behaviors. So, 
one interesting research question to ask is: Will the tendency to form dense groups 
actually help group performance?  
Theory and Hypotheses 
From the structural perspective, I study the role of network configuration in 
this essay. The two important aspects in network structures are closure and structural 
hole. In this study, I investigate both the internal network closure and the external 
structural hole of a VC syndicate and examine how such network structures influence 
the syndicate performance.  
Closure is defined as the extent to which an ego’s partners are tied to each 
other. A network with higher closure indicates greater network cohesiveness. Th  
traditional social network theory has emphasized the positive influence of network 
closure and proposes that actors in a network benefit from network embeddedness. 
According to the traditional social network theory, network relations carry 
information and the connectivity among actors in a network facilitates information 
flow. The existence of common third parties and indirect ties not only makes it easier
to access information, but also helps validate the accuracy of the information 




flow in a dense network will help establish norms of behaviors that enforce actors to 
cooperate (Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Walker et al., 1997). Because reputation 
arising from the network embededdedness may increase cost of defection (Gargiulo, 
Ertug, & Galunic, 2009) and prevent actors from engaging in malfeasance 
(Granovetter, 1985; Raub & Weesie, 1990), firms in a dense network are less likely to 
engage in opportunistic behaviors that could jeopardize cooperation. Therefore, the 
social norms and sanction mechanisms produced by network closure often facilitate 
development of trust (Coleman, 1988, 1990) and, thus, reduce the need and cost for 
monitoring and coordination (Gulati & Singh, 1998).  
All these aspects of network closure promote cooperation among partners. 
Since group performance depends on successful involvement of collaboration 
(Kanter, 1994b), network closure has been expected to influence group performance 
positively. Empirical studies have shown the proof of such positive impact of network 
closure. For example, at the team level, research found that team internal network 
density helps establish cooperation norms (Lazega, 2001), significantly increase team 
productivity (Reagans & Zuckerman, 2001) and reduce the duration needed to 
complete a project (Reagans et al., 2004). Even though these studies have greatly 
improved our understanding of the impact of network density, network density effects 
in these studies have always been detached from network formation behaviors 
because individuals in a team are often assigned by supervisors. Studying network 
density of groups formed by firm self-selection can shed light to the consequencs of 




In the context of VC investment, VC firms put more than money into the 
startup company they are investing in: They add values in three aspects: management 
assistance, intensive monitoring, and reputational capital (Black & Gilson, 1998). 
Thus, cooperation among VC syndicate members is important. Moreover, since 
investment in startup companies involves a tremendous amount of uncertainty, trust 
among VC syndicate members becomes especially important. The repeated 
interaction among syndicate members enables expectations of their partners’ 
behaviors. In addition, trust among syndicate members may also improve the chance 
of securing following-on investment. All these informal mechanisms will 
complement the formal cooperation mechanisms to facilitate cooperation and ensure 
the success of the investment deal (Wright & Lockett, 2003). Therefore, I expect  
H1: Syndicate internal density will positively influence the performance of the 
startup company.  
 The central argument behind the positive impact of network closure on team 
performance is its role in reducing coordination cost through the improvement of 
trust. However, coordination required in the syndicate may vary with the group 
context, depending on who are involved in the syndicate. As argued in Essay I, 
coordination difficulties increase with both group size and group heterogeneity 
(Litwak & Hylton, 1962; Litwak & Rothman, 1970). Hence, the need to facilitate 
coordination will be greater in larger or heterogeneous groups. Greater density will 
improve coordination more in larger or heterogeneous groups than in smaller or 
homogenous groups. Therefore, a bigger positive impact of network closure on group 




H2: The positive impact of syndicate density on startup company performance 
will be greater in larger syndicate groups.  
H3: The positive impact of syndicate density on startup company performance 
will be greater in more heterogeneous syndicate groups.  
As opposed to the need for network density caused by difficulties in 
coordination, some group tasks may increase the necessity for coordination and 
cooperation. Younger companies are short of structure, routines, operation 
mechanisms, as well as client and customer resources (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). The VC investors often become their first organizational 
partners (Hallen, 2008) and offer help in both management and monitoring (Black & 
Gilson, 1998). Thus, the necessity for nonfinancial inputs from VC investors will 
depend on the developmental stage of the startup company. Younger companies tend 
to need greater nonfinancial support from VC syndicate members than mature 
companies. Therefore,  
H4: The positive impact of syndicate density on startup company performance 
will be greater for younger startup companies. 
Besides the local internal network constructed by the ties among syndicate 
members, a syndicate itself is also located in a VC syndication network resulted from 
the prior ties of its syndicate members with other VCs who are not participating in he 
focal syndicate. A firm’s network position has been found to be influential by both 
the network closure perspective (Coleman, 1988) and the structural hole theory (Burt, 




Developing from the pioneering work of “strength of weak ties” by 
Granovetter (1973), Burt (Burt, 1992, 1997) proposed that network benefits actually 
come from sparse networks, rather than from cohesive relations. He used the 
structural hole to refer to “the separation between nonredundant contacts” (Burt, 
1992). According to the structural hole theory, although network embeddedness 
increases the amount and speed of information flow within the network, the 
information that an actor gets from a dense ego network is often redundant. On the 
other hand, actors in a network rich of structural holes will get information from 
disconnected clusters. The adding of new information from disconnected partners 
increases both efficiency and effectiveness of the information flow. Besides the 
benefits arising from information diversity, actors in a bridging position also have the 
advantage in negotiating relationships. Actors with more structural holes enjoy the 
control benefits by taking the role of tertius gaudens — Simmel (1955)’s conception 
for “the third party who benefits” (Burt, 1992) — and playing other partners against 
each other. Thus, the structural hole theory suggests that to maximize the benefits
from the network, an actor should increase size and nonredundancy as much as 
possible (Podolny & Baron, 1997).  
Both the network closure perspective and the structural hole theory argue the 
positive influence of network structure in the economic field by emphasizing its role 
in information access and control. However, the two theories depart in how network 
structure influences actors’ economic performances. Since increase in network 
closure means decrease in the structural hole, the two theories seem to give 




beneficial. While the network closure perspective emphasizes the importance of 
establishing norms and trust in economic action (Coleman, 1990), the structural hole 
theory argues that network benefits mainly come from nonredundant information and 
control (Burt, 1992, 1997). The network closure perspective argues that cohesive 
relationships benefit information flow and provide concerted control through a 
sanction mechanism, but the structural hole theory proposes that cohesive 
relationships negatively influence information flow and kill the bridging 
opportunities.  
Despite the seeming contradiction of the traditional social network theory and 
the structural hole theory, researchers have reconciled these two perspective  by 
distinguishing local and global structural holes (Burt, 2000; Reagans et al., 2004). 
These studies concluded that while network closure within a team fosters team 
performance through facilitating coordination and cooperation, external structural 
holes beyond the team will help improve the team’s performance by providing 
nonredundant information and brokerage opportunities. Thus, while network closure 
within a group has positive impact on group performance, structural holes outside of 
the ego group may help the group perform better. Empirical research has shown 
support for the positive impact of structural holes at the team-level ego network. For 
instance, Reagans, Zuckerman and Mcevily (2004) found that the external range 
measured by the average structural hole of team members helped reduce the project 
duration of the team. Zaheer & Soda (2009) discovered that structural holes in a TV
production team’s ego network improved the audience share of the TV production. 




teams had more structural holes in the their external advisory networks were mor 
likely to achieve greater improvement in their sales revenue.  
Using VC investment context, Podolny (2001) suggested that structural holes 
may bring firms various opportunities as well as information about how to fill hose 
opportunities.  The information diversity due to greater amount of structural holes not 
only will reduce egocentric uncertainty as found by Podolny (2001), but also may 
boost performance of the VC syndicates. Thus, based on the previous literature, I 
expect a positive impact of external structural holes of VC syndicates.  
H5: A syndicate’s external structural holes will positively influence the 
performance of the startup company.  
In the VC syndication network, information and knowledge sharing is very 
critical to the performance of both portfolio companies and VC firms. A focal 
syndicate with more structural holes in its ego network is more likely to add value to 
the portfolio company due to its access to diverse information. However, since 
different tasks may require different types of knowledge and information, an ego’s 
ability to benefit from network structure may differ depending on the type of the task. 
Research has found that structural holes are more important to exploratory task than 
to exploitative task. For example, Hansen, Podolny, and Pfeffer (2001) found that 
teams having a network rich in structural holes required a longer time to complete an 
exploitative project but completed exploratory projects more quickly. Similarly, 
Lechner, Frankenberger, and Floyd (2010) found that structural holes had greater 





In VC investment context, VC syndicates provides monitoring and 
management assistance besides financial support (Black & Gilson, 1998). Due to the 
lack of structure and organizational routines in younger companies (Bruderl & 
Schussler, 1990; Stinchcombe, 1965), the knowledge needed for monitoring and 
nurturing an early stage company is more tacit and intensive than that needed for a 
company in a later stage. Thus, depending on the stage of startup companies, the 
nature of VC syndicates’ tasks varies. Information with greater diversity will be more 
helpful in decision making for earlier-stage companies than for later-stage companies. 
Therefore, I expect that the external structural holes have a greater positive influence 
on performance of younger companies.  
H6: The positive impact of syndicate structural holes on startup company 
performance will be greater for a younger company.  
Methodology 
Data 
As shown in the first essay, VC firms self-select into deals when forming 
syndicates for startup companies. Following the first two essays that study VC 
syndicate formation, in this essay I study the performance implication of syndicate 
behaviors and examine how VC syndicate attributes may influence the performance 
of startup companies. Consistent with prior essays, I used first round syndicate data 
from the VentureXpert database. Different from the prior two essays that used 
matched samples to study syndicate formation behaviors, this essay used first round 
syndicates formed in real cases to study the performance implication of syndication 




same round, I studied how the internal network relationships and the external network 
position of a first round syndicate influence the likelihood of the startup company 
going public or being acquired by larger firms.  
Given the fact that the average duration for an IPO is usually less than 5 ye rs  
(about 4.7 years) (Cumming & Macintosh, 2001), I focused on startup companies that 
received their first syndicate investment between 1985 and 2003 to ensure that the
companies whose first round syndicates formed in 2003 still have 5 years to achieve 
IPO or acquisition10. To check the existence of selection bias and connect syndicate 
formation behaviors and performance implication, this study only includes the startup 
companies studied in Essay 1 and funded from 1985 to 2003. The sample contains 
2,447 startup companies with first round syndicates formed by U.S. VCs.  
Measures 
Dependent variable: 
Startup company performance. Since VC firms form syndicates to facilitate 
the success of startup companies, startup company performance is a critical indicator 
measuring the performance of VC syndicates. Research suggested that VC firms 
provide both financial and nonfinancial inputs to startup companies and the 
nonfinancial inputs are closely related to the success of a startup company (Black & 
Gilson, 1998). Since financial inputs and nonfinancial support are linked to each 
other, in order to recycle the nonfinancial inputs for a new deal, VC firms need to exit 
from their current investments. Therefore, exit from an invested startup comany is 
an important indicator of success for the VC investors. The dependent variable in this 
                                                
10 To make sure that firms funded in later 1990s or early 2000s will have enough time to exit, I verify 




essay is a dummy variable that indicates whether a startup company went public or 
was acquired by the end of 2008. 
Independent variables: 
Syndicate internal density: Syndicate internal density is used to measure the 
cohesion and closure of VC syndicates. It is calculated as the proportion of 
preexisting ties to the possible ties in a syndicate based on tie history of syndicate 
members in the prior five years. It is a continuous variable with the range between 0 
and 1. 
External structural holes: To measure the external network position of a focal 
VC syndicate, I accumulate the ties between its members and other VC firms outside 
of the focal syndicate in the current year. Thus, a focal syndicate is treated as the ego 
in the VC syndication network when its external network structure is measured. A VC 
partner who did not invest in the focal syndicate but had ties with any members in the 
focal syndicate becomes an alter in the ego network of the focal syndicate. The tie
strength between a focal syndicate and its alter VC will be calculated by the total tie 
strength its syndicate members have with this particular alter. Based on the ego 
network of a focal syndicate, I measured its external structural holes using Burt’s 
efficiency measure (Zaheer & Soda, 2009). Even though Burt has proposed different 
measures of structural holes, I adopted his efficiency measure in this essay because 1) 
the argument in this paper about syndicate-level ego networks focuses on information 
and knowledge sharing; 2) the constraint measure of structural holes focuses more on 




account of the size of the ego network and measures the number of structural hole per 
contact.  
To measure efficiency, I first calculated the effective size of the ego network, 
which measures the extent to which information access, timing, and referrals from 
ego’s contacts are nonredundant. Then, I divided the effective size of the ego network 
by ego network size to calculate the efficiency of an ego network. Thus, the 
efficiency of an ego network of syndicate i is calculated as 
 ∑j[1-∑qpiqmjq]/N 
where, 
piq is the proportion of the ego i’s ties with alter q 
mjq is the tie strength between alter j and q divided by the maximum tie 
strength alter j has with anyone in the network.  
N is the total number of contacts i has in its ego network.  
Syndicate size is measured by counting the number of VC firms involved in a 
first round syndicate.  
Syndicate experience heterogeneity is calculated using coefficient of variation, 
which is the standard deviation of syndicate member experience divided by the 
average of syndicate member experience. VC experience used in this measure was 
calculated as the total number of companies a VC firm has invested in until the prior 
year of the syndicate was formed.  
Company age: Company age is measured as the age of the company when the 






I included three categories of control variables. The first category of control 
variables refers to the quality and characteristics of the startup company. The quality 
of a startup company is highly related to its likelihood of going to IPO or being 
acquired by a larger firm. Due to the data limitation, it is impossible to directly 
observe the quality of startup companies. However, prior research has suggested that 
quality can be represented using appropriate proxies (e.g., Kirsch, Goldfarb, & Gera, 
2009). In this essay, I used the total amount of money invested in the first round 
syndicate as a proxy to control for the quality of the startup company. The underlyi g 
assumption is that VC firms collect information to judge the quality of the company 
and then approximately arrange their financing based on their judgment. Startup 
companies with more promising future are likely to get more money in the first 
round, which, according to the resource-based view (Barney, 1991), will in turn help 
them to succeed. Thus, I controlled for the investment amount in the first round of 
syndication when studying the impacts of syndicate network structures on startup 
company performance. To remove effect of inflation, I converted all investment 
amounts to 1985 dollars. Since this variable is skewed, I took the log transformation 
to correct for the skewness.  
Liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and liability of adolescence 
(Bruderl & Schussler, 1990) perspectives agreed that companies are going to be more 
promising and less likely to fail when they mature. Moreover, startup companies at 
different investment stages may require different amounts of nurturing and 




consideration the startup company stage at the first round syndicate. I created dummy 
variables to indicate whether the first round syndicate happens in the seed or the early 
stage as opposed to the expansion stage. The company stage is correlated to the 
company age, but these two variables still vary with each other. So, following prior 
research (e.g., Chemmanur & Tian, 2010), I included both in the performance 
functions.  
The second category of control variables includes the attributes of the first 
round syndicates. The first is the average geographical distance between VC 
syndicate members and the startup company they invested in. As shown in Essay 1, 
this distance variable was calculated using the spherical geometry based on 
corresponding latitudes and longitudes of locations of VC firms and startup 
companies. Second, since research found that group diversity influences both internal 
and external network structures of the group (Reagans et al., 2004), I also included 
various measures of syndicate heterogeneity. Besides the VC experience 
heterogeneity, I controlled for two other heterogeneity variables of VC syndicates. 
VC type heterogeneity was calculated based on the entropy-based measure ∑pi*ln(1/ 
pi), where pi is the percentage of a specific VC type in the syndicate group. VC 
performance heterogeneity was measured by the coefficient of variation of VC 
performance in the syndicate, which equals to the standard deviation of syndicate 
member performance divided by the average of syndicate member performance.  VC 
performance was represented by the number of IPOs a VC has until the year before 




I also controlled for variables that reflect environmental influences. One of 
these variables is the industry heat measured by total number of IPOs in the industry 
of the startup company in the year prior to the focal syndicate. Other environmental 
variables include industry dummies and year dummies. I also controlled for the 
location of a startup company using dummy variables indicating whether the 
company is in Massachusetts or in California.  
In accordance with the dependent variable, which is a dummy, I first used a 
probit model to test the hypotheses. Then, I also employed a probit model with 
continuous endogeneous variables to control for the endogeneity and adopted 
heckman selection model to control for potential sample selection bias.  
Results 
 The descriptive statistics are given in Table 3.1. From this table, we can see 
that the syndicates I included in the sample vary in size, from involving only 2 to 11 
VC firms.  Although average VC distance and first round investment amounts only 
have less than 1% missing values, I generated dummy variables to control for the 
missing values for these two variables. This is because both the regular probit model 
and the probit model with endogeneous variables (ivprobit in Stata) drop observations 
that perfectly predict the outcome variable. Thus, simply dropping missing 
observations may aggravate the loss of sample size. Meanwhile, I dropped the 
observations with missing values in current structural holes. The reason is that a 
firm’s structural hole position is suspected to be endogeneous and it is not appropriate 
to put the dummy variable controlling for the missing observations as the 




ivprobit model comparable, I dropped all the observations with missing values on 
structural hole in the analysis.  
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Successful exit 2447 0.489 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Syndicate density 2447 0.377 0.427 0.000 1.000 
External structural hole 2398 0.880 0.086 0.250 1.000 
Syndicate size 2447 2.723 1.056 2.000   11.000 
VC perf hetero 2447 0.928 0.678 0.000 3.000 
Company age 2447 1.595 2.093 0.000   10.000 
First round amount 2419 7.919 1.099    -0.403   11.769 
Seed stage 2447 0.294 0.456 0.000 1.000 
Early stage 2447 0.501 0.500 0.000 1.000 
Avg geo dist b/w com & VC 2438 5.657 1.900 0.000 7.901 
VC type hetero 2447 0.343 0.377 0.000 1.609 
VC exp hetero 2447 0.959 0.455 0.000 3.000 
Industry heat 2447   32.168   36.144 0.000 131.000 
CA dummy 2447 0.463 0.499 0.000 1.000 
MA dummy 2447 0.141 0.348 0.000 1.000 
Area density 2447 0.103 0.145 0.000 1.000 
Avg geo dist among VCs 2370 5.410 2.540 0.000 7.908 
Past structural hole 2383 0.886 0.075 0.143 1.000 
 
 
The correlation matrix is shown in Table 3.2. One interesting finding from this 
table is that syndicate internal density is positively correlated with the syndicate’s 
external structural holes (r=0.19, with p value less than 0.0001). That is, the more 
densely connected syndicate members accumulate greater number of structural holes. 
One interpretation is that VC firm syndication network is really based on reciprocity. 
When they keep reproducing prior ties, they leave large structural holes in-between. 
Also, it shows that syndicates with greater heterogeneity in performance have more 
structural holes, larger syndicate size, and also more heterogeneity in experience. Not 
surprisingly, companies in seed stages tend to receive less amounts of investment 




I have argued that the internal density and external structural holes of a 
syndicate will positively influence startup company performance (Hypothesis 1 and 
5). To test these effects, a probit model with Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
was used and the results are shown in Table 3.3. In model 1, I include all control 
variables. As expected, companies that received greater amounts of money in the first 
syndicate round had better chance to exit. Companies that received their first 
syndicate round in the seed stage were less likely to go public or be acquired. Since 
the geographic distance may increase the difficulty of VC monitoring and nurturi g, 
average geographic distance between VC syndicate members and startup companies 




Table 3.2: Correlation Table 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Successful exit 1.000         
2 Syndicate density 0.074 1.000        
3 External structural hole -0.060 0.192 1.000       
4 Syndicate size 0.058 -0.053 0.236 1.000      
5 VC exp hetero -0.022 -0.322 0.029 0.209 1.000     
6 Company age 0.052 -0.080 -0.118 -0.034 0.014 1.000    
7 First round amount 0.036 -0.028 0.228 0.251 0.065 0.083 1.000   
8 Seed stage 0.018 0.106 0.015 -0.001 -0.055 -0.234 -0.330 1.000  
9 Early stage -0.054 -0.016 0.103 0.006 0.009 -0.022 0.179 -0.656 1.000 
10 Avg distance b/w com & VC 0.002 -0.059 0.083 0.175 0.039 0.008 0.120 -0.009 -0.029 
11 VC type hetero -0.009 -0.175 -0.017 0.279 0.187 0.081 0.087 -0.061 -0.025 
12 VC ipo hetero 0.014 -0.019 0.272 0.316 0.423 -0.018 0.137 0.000 0.037 
13 Industry heat -0.060 -0.094 0.067 0.012 0.054 -0.003 0.179 -0.142 0.091 
14 CA dummy 0.009 0.033 0.067 0.011 -0.008 -0.112 -0.045 0.075 -0.023 
15 MA dummy 0.035 0.082 -0.003 -0.005 -0.055 0.010 -0.028 0.038 -0.004 
 
 
  10 11 12 13 14 15 
10 Avg distance b/w com & VC 1.000      
11 VC type hetero 0.126 1.000     
12 VC ipo hetero 0.093 0.064 1.000    
13 Industry heat 0.004 0.039 0.021 1.000   
14 CA dummy 0.017 -0.072 0.038 -0.101 1.000  




Table 3.3: Probit Models of Syndicate Density and Structural Hole 
 
 Model_1 Model_2 Model_3 Model_4 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se 
     
DV: successful exit     
First round amount 0.134 0.129 0.143 0.139 
      0.029*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
First round amount missing 0.570 0.556 0.453 0.441 
 0.337+ 0.338+ 0.370 0.371 
Seed stage -0.151 -0.160 -0.139 -0.142 
 0.086+ 0.086+ 0.088 0.088 
Early stage -0.062 -0.069 -0.055 -0.059 
 0.072 0.072 0.074 0.074 
Avg dist b/w com and VC -0.025 -0.024 -0.020 -0.018 
 0.014+ 0.014+ 0.015 0.015 
Avg dist b/w com and VC missing -1.185 -1.171 -1.078 -1.090 
 0.561* 0.560* 0.616+ 0.618+   
VC type hetero -0.095 -0.080 -0.103 -0.088 
 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.076 
VC perf hetero 0.019 0.008 0.036 0.028 
 0.045 0.046 0.047 0.048 
Industry heat -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
CA dummy 0.029 0.026 0.038 0.038 
 0.059 0.059 0.060 0.060 
MA dummy 0.065 0.054 0.073 0.062 
 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 
Syndicate size 0.047 0.049 0.055 0.060 
 0.029 0.029+ 0.030+ 0.030*   
VC exp hetero -0.086 -0.051 -0.092 -0.047 
 0.066 0.069 0.069 0.072 
Company age 0.018 0.019 0.019 0.020 
 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 
Syndicate density  0.131  0.167 
  0.068+  0.071*   
External structural hole   -0.757 -0.941 
   0.348* 0.357**  
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -0.324 -0.381 0.204 0.248 
 0.312 0.313 0.397 0.398 
     
chi2 df_m 255.308 258.979 259.977 265.589 
N 2447 2447 2398 2398 
P 9.26E-33 4.95E-33 3.24E-33 7.60E-34 
Ll -1567.903 -1566.068 -1531.811 -1529.004 






In Model 2, 3, and 4, I added my main independent variables, syndicate 
density and structural holes. As expected, the results in Table 3.3 show that syndicate 
density has significant and positive relationships with companies’ chances of exit. But 
surprisingly, structural holes have a negative impact on the startup company’s 
likelihood of going public or being acquired. The underlying reason may be that the 
advantages from structural holes become questionable when cohesive ties are needed 
as a precondition to ensure actors’ willingness to share certain critical information 
and resources (Gargiulo et al., 2009; Podolny & Baron, 1997). The expected benefits 
of structural holes in VC syndicate external networks are mostly from information 
diversity, but lack of trust or the competition among VC firms may prevent critical 
information from transferring through bridging ties.  
However, the results about network structure variables in Table 3.3 may be 
biased due to endogeneity issues and sample selection bias. Endogeneity bias happens 
when internal network density and external structural holes are correlated with the 
unobservables in the error term that affect startup company performance. Typically, 
syndicate density or structural hole may be choice variables that are related to th  
startup company quality. Here, I used instrumental variable models to examine the 
existence of endogeneity and correct for the bias caused by the potential endogeneity 
issue. The instruments need to be correlated with the endogenous variable, 
uncorrelated with the error term in the structural model, and do not affect the 
dependent variable.  
For internal network density, I used two instrumental variables. One 




startup company’s industry and geographic state in the prior five years. This area 
network density is expected to have negative correlation with focal syndicate network 
density. Higher network density in the area may help the flow of tacit knowledge 
among VCs regarding to the startup company. So, the uncertainty about the startup 
company may be reduced due to the information flow in the area. Research has 
suggested that actors turned to those they trust in a situation with high uncertainty 
(Mizruchi & Stearns, 2001). Thus, the decreased uncertainty about a particular deal 
may reduce the need for high syndicate density. Meanwhile, there is no theory 
suggesting that the area network density is either correlated with the quality of the 
focal company (thus with the error term) or affect the performance of the focal 
company (i.e., chance of going public or being acquired).  
In order to avoid the weak instrument issue, I included another instrumental 
variable for internal syndicate density, which is the average geographic distance 
among VC syndicate members. Usually, VC syndicate members that are farfrom 
each other are less likely to work with each other (Sorenson & Stuart, 2001). Hence, I 
expect that greater average geographic distance should be negatively correlated with 
the syndicate density. Although geographic distance between VC firms and startup
companies may be related to the startup company performance, it is unlikely that 
distance among VC syndicate members will systematically influence startup company 
performance, especially after controlling for the distance between VC firms and 
startup company11. To remedy the effect of the missing observations on this 
instrumental variable, I also included a dummy variable indicating missing 
                                                
11 The result of the probit model that regresses startup company performance on average distance 




observations to control for the possible impact of missing values. The F test suggest 
that both instrumental variables significantly improve the model fit. 
For external structural holes of a focal syndicate, I used the past structural 
holes as the instrumental variable. Past structural holes are calculated based on the 
ego network ties of the current VC syndicate members in the prior 5-year moving 
window. That is, for a focal syndicate formed in 1999, I instrumented the current 
structural holes on the past structural holes of the syndicate in the period between 
1994 and 1998. Since network structure evolves depending on prior network ties, I 
expect that the network structural hole in the prior five years will be positively 
correlated with the current structural hole of the focal syndicate. Because the 
structural hole is sensitive to time and past structural holes may disappear due to the 
formation of new ties, structural holes existing in prior years should not influence 
performance of the current syndicate. Again, the F test shows that this instrumen al 
variable significantly improves the model that explains current structural holes.  
To control for the endogeneity, I used the ivprobit model in Stata to examine 
the impact of internal density and external (current) structural holes of VC syndicates. 
As shown in Table 3.4, I included internal syndicate density and external structural 
holes in Model 5 and Model 6 respectively, and add both of them together in Model 
7. The Wald tests of exogeneity in all three models are not significant. The 
insignificant Wald tests suggest that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that error term 
in the structural model and error term in the reduced-form model are not correlated, 
which means that there is no endogeneity issue. In fact, the rho in both Model 4 and 5 




Table 3.4: Probit Models Endogeneous Variables  
 
 model_5 model_6 model_7 
 b/se b/se b/se 
 IV probit MLE IV probit MLE IV probit Twostage 
 DV: density DV: exit DV: efficiency DV: exit DV: density DV: efficiency DV: exit 
first round amount 0.037 0.131 0.007 0.134 0.025 0.008 0.135 
 0.009*** 0.038*** 0.002*** 0.031*** 0.009** 0.002*** 0.031*** 
first round amount missing 0.106 0.562 0.076 0.242 0.105 0.079 0.276 
 0.098 0.347 0.019*** 0.391 0.104 0.019*** 0.395 
seed stage 0.073 -0.156 0.029 -0.195 0.035 0.028 -0.176 
 0.025** 0.097 0.005*** 0.095* 0.025 0.005*** 0.010+   
early stage 0.060 -0.066 0.015 -0.101 0.025 0.015 -0.093 
 0.021** 0.082 0.004*** 0.077 0.022 0.004*** 0.078 
avg dist b/w com and VC 0.014 -0.024 0.001 -0.024 0.009 -0.002 -0.019 
 0.006* 0.016 0.001 0.015 0.006 0.001 0.017 
avg dist b/w com and VC missing -0.028 -1.175 -0.036 -1.060 0.081 -0.046 -1.098 
 0.131 0.563* 0.026 0.622+ 0.146 0.027+ 0.627+   
VC type hetero -0.109 -0.086 -0.009 -0.091 -0.092 -0.009 -0.074 
 0.022*** 0.105 0.004* 0.077 0.022*** 0.004* 0.084 
VC perf hetero 0.078 0.012 0.013 -0.004 0.012 0.013 0.006 
 0.013*** 0.069 0.003*** 0.056 0.014 0.003*** 0.057 
Industry heat 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.002 
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 
CA dummy 0.010 0.027 0.007 0.021 -0.004 0.008 0.026 
 0.020 0.062 0.003* 0.061 0.020 0.004* 0.061 
MA dummy 0.080 0.058 0.003 0.062 0.061 0.004 0.047 
 0.026** 0.103 0.004 0.085 0.026* 0.005 0.090 
Syndicate size -0.008 0.048 0.011 0.037 -0.018 0.010 0.055 
 0.009 0.031 0.002*** 0.033 0.009* 0.002*** 0.043 
VC exp hetero -0.272 -0.065 -0.014 -0.041 -0.265 -0.014 0.017 




Table 3.4: Probit Models Endogeneous Variables (Cont.) 
 
 model_5 model_6 model_7 
 b/se b/se b/se 
 IV probit MLE IV probit MLE IV probit Twostage 
 DV: density DV: exit DV: efficiency DV: exit DV: density DV: efficiency DV: exit 
Company age -0.012 0.019 -0.001 0.017 -0.011 -0.001 0.019 
 0.004** 0.016 0.001+ 0.014 0.004** 0.001+ 0.015 
Syndicate density  0.079     0.269 
  0.651     0.485 
External structural hole    0.416   -0.548 
    1.070   1.838 
Area density -0.134    -0.094 0.010  
 0.065*    0.066 0.012  
avg geo dist among VC -0.024    -0.023 0.003  
 0.005***    0.005*** 0.001**  
avg geo dist among VC missing -0.074    -0.049 0.002  
 0.050    0.050 0.009  
past structural hole   0.393  1.379 0.392  
   0.022***  0.123*** 0.023***  
Industry dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year dummies Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
_cons 0.447 -0.359 0.404 -0.600 -0.542 0.404 -0.058 
 0.093*** 0.418 0.024*** 0.826 0.135*** 0.025*** 1.156 
athrho        
_cons 0.020  -0.091     
 0.250  0.077     
lnsigma        
_cons -0.965  -2.695     
 0.014***  0.015***     
Wald test of exogeneity  0.010  1.400   0.580 
chi2 df_m  235.748  234.411   234.382 
N  2447  2362 2362 2362 2362 
p  8.51E-29  1.48E-28 3.10E-114 2.00E-169 3.59E-28 




In order to verify the validity of my instrumental variables, I tried to use only 
one of the instrumental variables for syndicate density in both Model 5 and Model 7, 
and obtained similar results. I also calculated another alternative instrumental 
variables, which are 77 area dummies indicating the industry and state of each foc l 
startup company. Again, the results hold robust when I put the alternative 
instrumental variable alone or together with the other two instrumental variables used 
in Models 5 through Model 7. The reason that I did not find significant endogeneity 
issue in the sample may be because there are two opposing explanations in terms of 
how syndicate density is correlated with the quality of a startup company. One is the 
reciprocity argument. VC firms may choose to form syndicates with familiar partners 
when a startup company is more promising and regard this as a gesture of recipr city. 
The other is the uncertainty argument, which suggests that VC firms tend to form 
syndicates with familiar partners when they are more uncertain about the quality of 
the startup company. Since promising startup companies tend to demonstrate less 
uncertainty, the two effects may randomly cancel each other so that endogeneity does 
not show up in the sample. According to Wooldridge (2002), the regular probit model 
is more preferable when there is no endogeneity. Thus, based on the results from the 
probit model in Table 3.3, I find support for hypothesis 1 and opposite effect for 
hypothesis 5.  
In addition to the endogeneity issue caused by reversed causality, there may 
be sample selection bias, because only the performance of the syndicates formed in 
reality can be observed. In order to examine this possibility and control for the 




regression in Essay I. As shown in Table 3.5, the Wald test in Model 8 suggests that 
the error term in the selection equation is uncorrelated with the error term in the 
interest equation (again, the correlation value rho is close to 0). The results from the 
Heckman selection model further confirm the appropriateness of using a regular 
probit model.  




 DV: successful exit DV: syndicate formation 
First round amount 0.052 0.009 
 0.011*** 0.005+   
First round amount missing 0.185 0.010 
 0.127 0.077 
Seed stage -0.052 0.002 
 0.032 0.015 
Early stage -0.024 -0.001 
 0.028 0.012 
Avg dist b/w com & VC -0.011 -0.055 
 0.011 0.011*** 
Avg dist b/w com & VC missing -0.368 -0.370 
 0.136**  0.178*   
VC type hetero -0.040 -0.167 
 0.035 0.034*** 
VC perf hetero 0.006 -0.058 
 0.020 0.023*   
Industry heat -0.001 0.000 
 0.001 0.000 
CA dummy 0.014 -0.029 
 0.022 0.010**  
MA dummy 0.018 -0.074 
 0.033 0.014*** 
Syndicate density 0.099 0.634 
 0.094 0.042*** 
External structural hole -0.439 -1.639 
 0.249+   0.212*** 
Syndicate size 0.026 0.064 
 0.014+   0.009*** 
VC exp hetero -0.006 0.160 
 0.036 0.036*** 
Company age 0.008 0.002 
 0.005 0.002 
Avg geo dist among VC  -0.029 








 DV:successful exit DV:syndicate formation 
Avg geo dist among VC missing  -0.171 
  0.083*   
Inside indirect tie density  0.317 
  0.164+   
Outside indirect tie density  -0.160 
  0.037*** 
Industry competition  -0.004 
  0.019 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  
Year dummies Yes Yes  
_cons 0.567 0.628 
 0.160*** 0.195**  
Athrho   
_cons  0.142 
  0.333 
Lnsigma   
_cons  -0.741 
  0.037*** 
Wald test of indp  0.180 
chi2 df_m  346.880 
N  14291 
P  3.87E-49 
Ll  -7724.302 
 
To test whether internal density and external structural holes of the focal 
syndicate will have different influences depending on group context and syndicate 
attributes (hypotheses 2,3,4, and 6), I put interaction terms of the network structure 
variables with other independent variables in the models 9 through 13 and the results 
are given in Table 3.6. None of the interaction terms is significant. This may be 
because the interaction terms used in the models assumed linear function, but the 
moderation effect of group context may not be linear. To explore this possibility, I d d 
further analysis in split samples and coded syndicate size, syndicate heterogeneity, 




Table 3.6: Probit Models of Interaction Terms (Based on Linear Measures) 
 
 model_9 model_10 model_11 model_12 model_13 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
      
DV: successful exit      
first round amount 0.139 0.139 0.141 0.139 0.139 
 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
first round amount missing 0.443 0.431 0.452 0.443 0.443 
 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.371 0.371 
seed stage -0.146 -0.140 -0.132 -0.142 -0.134 
 0.088+ 0.088 0.088 0.088 0.088 
early stage -0.061 -0.058 -0.050 -0.059 -0.052 
 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.075 
avg dist b/w com and VC -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.017 
 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
avg dist b/w com and VC missing -1.095 -1.087 -1.104 -1.099 -1.107 
 0.619+ 0.618+ 0.618+ 0.620+ 0.620+   
VC type hetero -0.083 -0.087 -0.082 -0.087 -0.076 
 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.077 
VC perf hetero 0.033 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.038 
 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.048 
Industry heat -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
CA dummy 0.035 0.035 0.036 0.037 0.030 
 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 
MA dummy 0.060 0.058 0.058 0.061 0.051 
 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.085 
Syndicate density 0.198 0.154 0.163 0.166 0.181 
 0.076** 0.072* 0.071* 0.071* 0.077*   
Structural hole -0.945 -0.937 -0.939 -0.909 -0.932 
 0.357** 0.357** 0.357** 0.363* 0.363*   
Syndicate size 0.051 0.060 0.059 0.060 0.048 
 0.031 0.030* 0.030* 0.030* 0.031 
VC exp hetero -0.041 -0.039 -0.044 -0.048 -0.028 
 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.073 
Company age 0.021 0.021 0.024 0.019 0.025 
 0.014 0.014 0.014+ 0.014 0.015+   
Syndicate density*Syndicate size 0.088    0.098 
 0.083    0.085 
Syndicate density*VC exp hetero  -0.135   -0.158 
  0.150   0.152 
Syndicate density*Company age   -0.045  -0.042 
   0.031  0.032 
Structural hole*Company age    -0.074 -0.018 






Table 3.6: Probit Models of Interaction Terms (Based on Linear Measures) 
(Cont.) 
 
 model_9 model_10 model_11 model_12 model_13 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.440 0.240 0.291 -0.551 -0.434 
 0.414 0.392 0.399 0.327+ 0.324 
      
chi2 df_m 266.702 266.400 267.716 265.871 269.847 
N 2398 2398 2398 2398 2398 
p 1.19E-33 1.36E-33 7.78E-34 1.69E-33 4.78E-33 
ll -1528.448 -1528.599 -1527.941 -1528.863 -1526.87 
r2_p 0.080 0.080 0.081 0.080 0.081 
 
Syndicate size was coded into a dummy variable, with 1 indicating four or 
more VC firms involved in the syndicate, and 0 indicating two or three VC firms in 
the syndicate. The results of model 14 in Table 3.7 show that the interaction term 
between internal syndicate density and syndicate size dummy is positive and 
significant, which tells that syndicate density has greater impact on startup company 
performance if syndicates have four or more members. In fact, for syndicates with 
four or more VC firms, the impact of syndicate density jumps up by almost three 
times. To make sure that the results in Model 14 are not biased by endogeneity, I ran 
a probit model with endogeneous variables (based on both Model 5 and Model 7) in 
split samples of syndicates with two or three VCs and syndicates with four or more 
VCs separately.12 Again, the Wald test shows that there is no endogeneity in both 
subsamples. Thus, the results in Model 14 provide evidence to support Hypothesis 2. 
                                                
12
 This is because having interaction terms of an endogeneous variable and controlling for endogeneity 




Table 3.7: Probit Models of Interaction Terms (Based on Categorical Measures) 
 
 model_14 model_15 model_16 model_17 model_18 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
      
DV: successful exit      
First round amount 0.144 0.145 0.148 0.145 0.144 
 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
First round amount missing 0.473 0.452 0.492 0.461 0.467 
 0.390 0.393 0.390 0.394 0.389 
Seed stage -0.154 -0.145 -0.140 -0.147 -0.148 
 0.088+ 0.088 0.088 0.088+ 0.088+ 
Early stage -0.069 -0.065 -0.055 -0.063 -0.063 
 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.075 
Avg dist b/w com and VC -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 
 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
Avg dist b/w com and VC missing -1.070 -1.077 -1.077 -1.072 -1.061 
 0.568+ 0.568+ 0.572+ 0.566+ 0.562+ 
VC type hetero -0.071 -0.076 -0.074 -0.076 -0.066 
 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 0.076 
VC perf hetero 0.039 0.033 0.031 0.028 0.045 
 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.046 
Industry heat -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
CA dummy 0.037 0.037 0.040 0.039 0.031 
 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 
MA dummy 0.057 0.054 0.056 0.060 0.045 
 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.084 0.085 
Syndicate density 0.143 0.261 0.213 0.170 0.265 
 0.072* 0.093** 0.082** 0.070* 0.103*   
External structural hole -0.892 -0.869 -0.911 -0.776 -0.863 
 0.376* 0.377* 0.379* 0.466+ 0.467+   
Syndicate size dummy (four or more VCs) 0.082 0.119 0.120 0.122 0.078 
 0.081 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.081 
Syn density*syndicate size dummy 0.542    0.548 
 0.243*    0.245*   
VC exp hetero dummy (greater than mean) -0.011 0.008 -0.011 -0.015 0.015 
 0.061 0.063 0.061 0.061 0.063 
Syn density*VC exp hetero dummy  -0.192   -0.191 
  0.133   0.134 
Company age dummy (<=1) -0.161 -0.159 -0.169 -0.151 -0.176 
 0.115 0.115 0.119 0.118 0.123 
Company age dummy (<=3 & >=2) -0.185 -0.186 -0.192 -0.177 -0.196 
 0.124 0.124 0.127 0.127 0.132 
Company age dummy (<=5 & >=4) -0.012 -0.009 -0.009 -0.023 -0.020 
 0.147 0.147 0.149 0.152 0.155 
Syn density*com age dummy (<=1)   -0.017  -0.016 






Table 3.7: Probit Models of Interaction Terms (Based on Categorical Measures) 
 
 model_14 model_15 model_16 model_17 model_18   
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se   
Syn density*com age dummy (<=3 & >=2 )  -0.425  -0.385 
   0.260  0.260 
Syn density*com age dummy (<=5 & >=4 )  -0.139  -0.115 
   0.254  0.263 
Structural hole*com age dummy (<=1)    -0.045 0.034 
    0.816 0.832 
Structural hole*com age dummy (<=3 & >=2 )   -0.649 -0.468 
    1.131 1.141 
Structural hole*com age dummy (<=5 & >=4 )   -0.208 -0.027 
    1.143 1.171 
Industry dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.488 0.455 0.480 -0.308 -0.310 
 0.423 0.424 0.424 0.347 0.349 
      
chi2 df_m 248.513 242.036 242.632 240.772 251.341 
N 2398 2398 2398 2398 2398 
p 1.39E-29 2.00E-28 8.34E-28 1.77E-27 1.43E-27 
ll -1526.783 -1528.008 -1527.691 -1528.85 -1524.374 
r2_p 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.083 
 
Hypothesis 3 argues that there are moderating effects of group heterogeneity 
such that the impact of syndicate density is greater for more heterogeneous groups. I 
generated a group heterogeneity dummy using its mean13. It was coded as 1 for 
syndicate groups with heterogeneity greater than the sample mean and 0 for the 
remaining syndicate groups. I added the group heterogeneity dummy and its 
interactions with syndicate density into Model 15. As shown in Table 3.7, the 
interaction term is not significant. Again, to verify the results, I split the sample based 
on the group heterogeneity dummy and checked endogeneity on both subsamples 
(syndicates with heterogeneity below mean and syndicates with heterogeneity above 
mean). The results show that internal density and external structural holes are 
                                                





significant and consistent with prior findings in the subsample including more 
heterogeneous syndicates, but not in the subsamples of less heterogeneity syndicates. 
However, the Wald tests on both subsamples are insignificant, suggesting that there 
are no endogeneity issues in both subsamples and results in the regular probit models 
are correct. Thus, hypothesis 3 is not supported.  
Hypothesis 4 and 6 propose that syndicates’ internal density and external 
structural holes have greater impact when the startup company is younger. Mod l 16 
and 17 in Table 3.7 included company age as a categorical variable and its 
interactions with syndicate density and external structural holes. The insignf cance of 
interaction terms indicates that the effects of syndicate density and external structural 
holes do not vary with company age. To validate there is no endogeneity bias in the 
results, I tested Model 7 on subsamples split by the categorical values of company 
age. Surprisingly, the Wald test indicates existence of endogeneity in the subsample 
for companies two or three years old. Further, syndicate density only has a positive 
and significant impact on the performance of startup companies that were two or 
three years old when they received their first round syndicate funding. The results 
may suggest that the companies at this stage just passed their “honeymoon” and are 
more likely to fail (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990). And there is greater uncertainty 
involved in these companies. Thus, the uncertainty argument may overshadow the 
reciprocity argument for companies at two or three years old so that syndicate ensity 
does not have significant influence in the regular probit model for this subsample, but 




evidence that syndicate density and structural holes have greater impacts for younger 
companies. Thus, hypotheses 4 and 6 are not supported.  
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Following the first two essays that study group network formation, this third 
essay studies the performance implication of such group formation behaviors. It 
examines how the internal and external network structure attributes of a VC syndicate 
may influence the startup company performance. Specifically, I explore the impacts 
of a syndicate’s internal density and external structural holes on the startup 
company’s chance of going public and being acquired.  
In this essay, I argue that syndicate density may positively influence the 
startup company performance because network closure contributes to the 
development of trust and improve the coordination/cooperation inside a syndicate. 
Because the need for coordination is greater in VC syndicates that are large in siz , 
that have greater heterogeneity, or that are formed for younger startup companies, I 
further argue that the positive impact of syndicate density will be greater in those 
syndicates. In addition to the network structure within a syndicate, I also study the 
role of a syndicate’s external network structure. Based on the structural hole the ry, I 
argue that a syndicate’s external structural holes have positive impact on startup
company performance, mostly due to the greater access to diverse information.  
Syndicates network attributes are the result of syndicate formation behaviors. 
When studying the impact of syndicate network structure attributes, it is important to 




formation. The empirical results suggest that formation of dense syndicates or 
syndicates with more structural holes does not vary systematically with unobserved 
variables, such as startup company quality. In addition, there is no significant sample 
selection bias either. Given the nonexistence of such potential biases, the empirical 
analysis find significant impacts of syndicate density as well as the syndicate external 
structural holes, although the impact of external structural holes is opposite to my 
initial expectation. Also, greater impact of syndicate density is observed in larger 
syndicates with four or more VC firms.  
Prior studies on teams have found a positive impact of global or external 
structural holes on team performance (Reagans et al., 2004; Reagans & Zuckerman, 
2001). However, sharing knowledge and information generates a cost for the 
information provider (Reagans & Mcevily, 2003). Networks with cohesive ties and 
high closure may facilitate such exchange due to the established trust and normative 
order (Coleman, 1990). Besides, there may be a cost associated with non-sharing in 
dense networks due to the reputation distribution and the sanction mechanisms. 
Because of the safe environment of knowledge sharing created by dense ties among 
alters, Ahuja (2000a) found that greater amount of structural holes decreased a firm’s
innovation and Gargiulo, Ertug, and Galunic (2009) found that information acquirers 
benefited more from network closure. Thus, the negative impact of structural holes 
found in this essay suggests that information sharing in the VC syndication network 
may depend on the partners’ willingness to share. It also indicates that the effect of 
network structures not only depends on the location of the network structural hole 




network ties (i.e., the purpose of network ties). Even global structural holes may have 
a negative impact on ego performance. Only when the type of network ties is taken 
into consideration can influences of network structures be explained.  
Although we find a positive impact of syndicate density on startup company 
performance, there was also a positive correlation between syndicate densityand 
external structural holes. That is, when VC firms keep forming repeated ties, it may 
leave structural holes in the ego network of a syndicate. It is likely that the positive 
impact of syndicate density may be offset by the negative impact of external 
structural holes. Repeated ties may actually be a double-edged sword depending on 
the type or the purpose of the network ties.  
This research casts light on how network formation behaviors may influence 
the group performance. Although it has been found that firms tend to form ties with 
familiar partners, it is not clear whether such network formation behavior may 
actually have positive influence on task performance. Due to the important influence 
of prior ties in network tie formation, the study of syndicate network structure based 
on prior ties has important meaning to the network formation literature. The 
performance consequence of such formation behaviors may be used to explain future 
network tie formation. Also, the opposite influences of internal density and external 
structural holes suggest that in firm cooperation networks, firms need to 
simultaneously consider two different network structures (both internal and external) 
as well as the type of network ties.  
This essay also makes contributions to the entrepreneurship literature. 




than single VC investment (Brander et al., 2002; Tian, 2008). However, when VC 
syndication gets more popular, it is necessary to explain what kinds of syndicates are 
more helpful. Taking a structural perspective, this essay links the network they with 
the entrepreneurship literature and explores the type of network structures of VC 
syndicates that are more beneficial for startup companies. 
There are also some limitations in this study. First, this current study only 
focuses on a startup company’s likelihood of going public or being acquired. It is 
interesting to examine how the internal and external network structures of syndicates 
may influence other aspects of startup company performance, such as the duraion of 
exit. Second, future research may also study the process that first round VC 
syndicates influence startup company performance. For example, greater closure of 
the first round VC syndicate may increase the likelihood of subsequent VC 
investment and bring greater amount of fund in subsequent round, both of which will 
in turn increase the chance of successful exit. Third, there are still many questions left 
unanswered regarding what kind of syndicates are more helpful to the success of 
startup companies. Future research may study the impacts of the shared experiences 
of the first round VC syndicate members as well as the variation of their tie st engths. 
Furthermore, future studies should extend beyond first round syndicates and take a 
dynamic point of view to consider how the evolution of syndicates in subsequent 
rounds may influence the success rate of startup companies. Fourth, research has 
suggested that many group attributes may have opposing effects. For example, 
syndicate size may enable startup companies to receive more support, but may also 




within the group, but may sacrifice support from outside of the group. How firms 
could take advantage of the positive side while minimizing the negative side is 







Summary and Conclusion 
Networking and partnership are important phenomena in the business world. 
Since inter-firm groups, alliances, or syndicates often involve more than two firms, it 
is important to understand the interplay of tie formations among all potential group 
members and its impact on task performance.  
Using VC syndicates as my research context, I examine three research 
questions in this dissertation: 1) How do groups with different levels of density form?
2) When is it more likely for a firm to participate in a group with mostly unfamili r 
firms? and 3) How do group internal and external network structures influence task 
performance, and how may group attributes moderate these relationships?  
Taking a group perspective, I simultaneously examine the formation of all ties 
in a group by focusing on the path-dependence effect of previous ties among ll 
potential group members. Then, to get into the group structure while still capturing all 
tie formations involved in a group at the same time, I combine a firm focus with the 
group perspective. Although a pure group perspective enables me to discover group-
level mechanisms, the firm-focused group perspective aids to uncover the group 
formation dynamics between one firm and other group members and explains how 
group formation may fail because of one particular firm. These group-level network 
formation studies help me link network formation behaviors with task performance 
through group network attributes.  All together, the three essays enrich our 
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